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I. THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE PROPOSED CHOICE SYSTEM1
Traditional tort liability for personal injury from auto accidents
has long been criticized on the grounds that its costs are too high and
that any compensation it provides is inefficient, unfair and dilatory.2
But no-fault laws, the putative alternative to strict tort systems, are in
turn criticized as infringing on the fundamental legal right to be paid
for noneconomic damages,' and as failing in their promise to contain
auto insurance costs.4 This latter criticism may be countered with the
argument that the economic shortcomings of no fault laws are not
inherent, but rather result from the politically driven character of
many state no-fault laws: such laws are crafted to preserve too many
full-scale tort claims-above defined thresholds of either dollar losses
or verbally described severe injuries-payable in addition to no-fault
claims.5 Is there a reform of auto insurance that will meet these criti-
cisms from both sides?
In this Article we examine a reform system that replaces current
no-fault proposals.6 Current no-fault systems must bear the burden of
not only automatic payment for economic loss but also, once thresh-
old injury levels are reached, expensive tort claims for noneconomic
loss. Moreover, automatic payment provisions often serve to subsidize
tort claimants and thereby to facilitate the bringing of tort claims.7
1. This Article is an expansion of a previous article by the same authors, except for
Daniel Kaiser, entitled Consumer Choice in the Auto Insurance Market, 52 MD. L. REV. 1016
(1993) [hereinafter O'Connell et al.]; both Articles focus on estimating the cost savings
resulting from adoption of the "choice plan." Both this work and our previous article
make use of earlier data and estimates prepared and published by the RAND Corporation.
See STEPHENJ. CARROLL ET AL., No FAULT APPROACHES TO COMPENSATING PEOPLE INJURED IN
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS (1991); STEPHEN J. CARROLL & JAMES S. KAKALi, NO-FAULT
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE (1991).
2. See CARROLL & KAKAuK, supra note 1, at ii;JEFFREY O'CONNELL & C. BRIAN KELLY,
THE BLAME GAME: INJURIES, INSURANCE, AND INJUSTICE 114-15 (1987). For more recent
data, see INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, AUTo INJURIES: CLAIMING BEHAVIOR AND ITS IM-
PACT ON INSURANCE COSTS (1994).
3. For purposes of this Article, noneconomic damages refer mainly to pain and
suffering.
4. CARROLL & KAKALIK, supra note 1, at vii; O'CONNELL & KELLY, supra note 2, at 118.
5. O'CONNELL & KELLY, supra note 2, at 120.
6. See infra Appendix B for the terms of a draft bill implementing this proposal. For a
journalistic discussion of the bill and the justification therefore, see Trevor Armbrister,
This Could Slash Your Car Insurance Bill, READER'S DIGEST, Feb., 1995, at 181.
7. O'CONNELL & KELLY, supra note 2, at 120. For a further discussion of the arguable
subsidy effect afforded tort claims by PIP benefits, see id.; STEPHEN CARROLL & ALLAN
ABRAHAMSE, THE COSTS OF ExCESSIVE CLAIMING FOR AUTOMOBILE PERSONAL INJURIES (forth-
coming 1995);Jeffrey O'Connell & RobertJoost, Giving Motorists a Choice Between Fault and
No-Fault Insurance, 72 VA. L. REV. 61, 70-72 (1986). For a discussion of the mutually infla-
tionary effect of health and disability insurance and liability insurance, see Jeffrey
O'Connell, Reforming Both Liability and Health Insurance, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 106 (1993-
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This new type of reform would give motorists the option of foregoing
claims for noneconomic loss, without forcing them to do so.8 Thus,
motorists would be given the option of purchasing PIP coverages9 at
the financial responsibility level required by state law for personal in-
jury liability.1 ° Persons electing such PIP coverage could neither sue
nor be sued for pain and suffering when involved in accidents with
others whether the latter had elected PIP coverage or not. However,
PIP motorists could claim in tort for economic loss in excess of their
PIP coverage against such other motorists. 1 An exception for both
PIP payment and exemptions from tort liability for noneconomic loss
arises when motorists' drug or alcohol abuse causes the injury. In that
event, no PIP payment would be due to substance abusing motorists,
nor would any restriction on the right to sue them in tort apply.12
As to accidents between PIP insureds and those electing to stay
under the tort system, tort insureds would make a claim against their
own insurer for economic and noneconomic loss-under coverage
termed "tort maintenance coverage"-just as they do today under un-
insured motorists' coverage." Claims for economic loss in excess of
one's own tort maintenance coverage would be allowed against PIP
insureds. In accidents between tort liability insureds, the current com-
mon-law system would apply without change.
94);Jeffrey O'Connell, Blending Reform of Tort Liability and Health Insurance: A Necessary Mix,
79 CORNELL L. REv. - (forthcoming March 1995); Jeffrey O'Connell & Michael
Horowitz, The Lawyer Will See You Now: Health Reform's Tort Crisis, WASH. POST, June 13,
1993, at C3.
8. The Bush administration, at the urging of Michael Horowitz andJeffrey O'Connell,
based on an article by O'Connell and Joost, supra note 7, proposed a federal statute
promulgating this type of auto insurance. Peter Passell, Bush's Bold Plan for Car Insurance,
N.Y. TIMES, OCL 17, 1992, at 41.
9. Throughout this discussion, we adopt the following terminology: payments with-
out reference to fault are referred to as "PIP," a popular acronym standing for personal
injury protection or personal protection insurance. See infra note 2 to Appendix B.
10. See O'Connell &Joost, supra note 7, at 63, 77-82. For example, Maryland requires
$20,000 for personal injury liability. For application of the reform to states already having
no-fault laws, see id. at 77-82.
11. Passell, supra note 8, at 41. Note that just as one can opt to buy more liability
insurance than financial responsibility limits mandate, so too could one opt to buy more
PIP coverage than financial responsibility limits mandate. But see infra note 1 to Appendix
A.
12. Passell, supra note 8, at 41. RAND's cost estimates in this study do not take account
of either provision as to drug or alcohol abuse because of the lack of sufficiently precise
figures in its data bank on drunken or drugged driving. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 1, at
13, 49-59 (explaining sources of data). But note that the costs of such motorists remaining
liable in tort will be offset, to a greater or lesser extent, by the savings from not paying PIP
benefits to them.
13. O'Connell et al., supra note 1, at 1026 & n.48. For an explanation of uninsured
motorist insurance coverage, see id. at 1028 n.55.
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PIP coverage would be in excess of all collateral sources' 4 and
payable periodically. When injured motorists pursue claims for eco-
nomic loss in excess of either PIP or tort maintenance coverages, a
reasonable attorney's fee, in addition to economic loss, would be re-
coverable.' 5 For purposes of the cost study in this Article, we assume
no change would be made in the law applicable to property damage.1 6
II. ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF THE CHOICE PLAN
A. General Approach
Our objective here is to go much further than our earlier Article.
Here we estimate the effect of the choice plan on the costs of per-
sonal, private passenger auto insurance 7 in every state currently with-
out a PIP plan limiting recovery for noneconomic losses. Not only do
we here estimate more precisely the percentage reductions in premi-
ums for motorists choosing the new coverage, but we also compute
the anticipated dollar savings as well. 8 As in our earlier study focus-
ing on the effects of the choice plan in the costs of personal auto
insurance to insured motorists," we focus here on the effects of the
choice plan on the amount each insured motorist must be charged on
average to defray the costs of compensating auto accident victims. As
used here, compensation costs include all the costs auto insurers incur
in compensating auto accident victims, including both compensation
paid to accident victims from all forms of auto insurance plus all trans-
action costs incurred in making such payments.2" We here first esti-
14. But see infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
15. The recovery of attorney's fees is necessary because attorney's fees today normally
are paid out of damage awards for pain and suffering; thus, a regime not paying for pain
and suffering calls for an alternate source for such payment. Pain and suffering damages
are "a rough measure of the plaintiffs attorney fees." C-mH.As WoLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS 528 n.21 (1986).
16. For an explanation of the rationale for excluding property damage from no-fault
coverage, see ROBERT E. KEETON &JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BAsic PROTECTION FOR THE TRLmc
VIC'nM 280-81 (1965). For a relatively minor change dealing with car damage in the
"choice" bill proposed herein, but not taken into account in this cost study, see infra Ap-
pendix B, subsection 14f.
17. Although our analysis examines only personal auto insurance, this plan would
likely have an even more favorable impact on insurance costs for commercial vehicles be-
cause the liability exposure of large commercial vehicles is even greater than that for pri-
vate passenger vehicles. Jeffrey O'Connell & Robert H. Joost, A Model Bill Allowing Choice
Between Auto Insurance Payable With and Without Regard to Fault, 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 947, 968
n.74 (1990).
18. See Table 1, infra, Col. 3 and Appendix A, Tree Charts.
19. O'Connell et al., supra note 1, at 1027-29.
20. Under traditional tort law, claimants must pay their legal fees and costs out of any
compensation they receive.
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mate what auto insurers would have to charge the average insured
motorist to recover the costs the insurers incur in compensating acci-
dent victims under all coverages under the traditional tort system. We
then develop corresponding estimates for motorists who elect to re-
main in the tort system and for motorists who elect PIP coverage
under the choice plan. We next compare these estimates to deter-
mine how the adoption of the choice plan would affect the cost of
auto insurance to motorists, depending on their insurance status
under the choice plan.
Under the traditional tort system, motorists can purchase several
different personal injury coverages-Bodily Injury (BI), Uninsured
Motorist (UM) including Underinsured Motorist (UIM), and Medical
Payments (MedPay). Accordingly, under the tort system, insured mo-
torists must bear the sum of the compensation costs of each of those
coverages. We estimate the compensation cost of the traditional tort
system for the average insured motorist as the sum of what insurers
pay out plus the associated transaction costs under all the above cover-
ages, divided by the total number of insured motorists. Motorists who
are uninsured, of course, bear none of the costs of auto insurance.
Under the choice plan, it will be recalled, motorists may remain
in the tort system, elect PIP coverage, or illegally remain uninsured.
Those who remain in the tort system must purchase tort maintenance
coverage, in addition to BI, and possibly UM and MedPay. Following
the pattern set forth in the foregoing paragraph, we estimate the aver-
age compensation costs for tort-insured motorists under the choice
plan as the sum of what auto insurers pay injured people plus the
associated transaction costs under all coverages on behalf of tort-in-
sured motorists, divided by the total number of tort-insured motorists.
Note that the average compensation costs for tort-insured motorists
include the costs insurers incur on their behalf in providing compen-
sation under tort liability coverages-BI, UM, and tort maintenance-
and any MedPay coverage.
Motorists who elect PIP coverage under the choice plan are not
limited to purchasing PIP. PIP-insured motorists also may purchase
BI to cover liability claims brought against them for losses in excess of
PIP or tort maintenance policy limits. Following the above pattern, we
estimate the average compensation costs for PIP-insured motorists as
the sum of the costs auto insurers incur on behalf of motorists who
elect PIP for both their PIP and their BI coverages, divided by the
number of PIP insureds. Note that this average equals the costs insur-
ers incur on behalf of PIP insureds in providing compensation under
both their PIP coverage and their BI coverage. As was the case under
1995] 285
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the traditional tort system, people who go uninsured under the choice
plan bear none of the costs of compensating auto accident victims. 2
1
We neglect the many other factors, such as insurers' overhead,
profit margins and investment income, that also affect insurance pre-
miums.2 2 However, compensation costs are a major component of in-
surance premiums. In the long run, we expect that the effects of the
choice plan on insurance premiums will be similar in both direction
and order of magnitude to its effects on compensation costs.
23
B. The Results
The effects of the choice plan on premiums charged to particular
drivers will vary with such factors as the coverages they buy, their pol-
icy limits, the insurer they choose, the mileage they drive, their loca-
tion within the state, and, of greater significance under the reform
than under a tort law, the type of car they drive. On this last point,
the first-party character of the choice plan allows insurers to calibrate
rates on the basis of the crash-worthy features of their insureds' vehi-
cles, thereby creating a market mechanism to enhance auto safety.
The proposal thus replaces today's third-party system under which the
obligation of insurers to pay those who claim against their insureds
makes it unfeasible to fix rates on the basis of the crash-worthy fea-
tures of their own insureds' autos.2 4 Keeping such variables in mind,
our estimates are meant only to indicate the general nature of cost
effects averaged over all drivers.
Granted these caveats, the savings we estimate for motorists who
choose PIP turn out to be very substantial. At the same time, however,
costs for motorists who elect to remain in tort under the choice plan
will be only marginally affected. Table 1 presents the costs of private
21. For more on RAND's methodology, see O'Connell et al., supra note 1, at 1054-59.
22. See CARROLL & KAKALiu, supra note 1, at 16-17 (noting the several factors affecting
insurance premiums); see also U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, COMPENSATING AuTo Acci-
DENT VICTIMS 67 (1985) (stating that the most important factor in determining insurance
premiums is the frequency and severity of the claimed loss).
23. See CARROLL & KAKALm, supra note 1, at 16 (stating that reducing injury compensa-
tion costs should lead to lower premiums because they are a large amount of overall insur-
ance costs). We thus focus this Article not on total premiums, but rather only on some of
the costs which contribute to total premiums: mainly, the costs of paying losses, which
constitute approximately three quarters of automobile insurance premiums. In effect,
costs for paying losses are the equivalent of the "pure premium" for personal injury-pure
premium being that portion of premium needed to pay losses-thereby excluding ex-
penses for marketing and other administrative costs. See Table 2, infra.
24. See O'Connell et al., supra note 1, at 1040-41. But see Warren Brown, Air Bag After-
math: The Device Saves Lives, But Socks Insurance Firms as Medical Costs Rise, WASH. POST, Mar.
21, 1993, at H1 (indicating that while air bags save lives, they may cause insurers higher
costs in payments for surviving victims' medical and rehabilitation expenses).
286 [VOL. 54:281
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TABLE 1: TOTAL PREMIUM SAVINGS UNDER PIP
(1) (2) (3)
Total premium savings for Total premium savings Total dollar savings
motorists with only mandatory for a!/ motorists who if all motorists
State System coverage who switch to PIP* switch to PIP* switch
(%) (%) ($ millions)
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
DE
ID
IL
IN
IA
LA
ME
MD
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NM
NC
OH
OK
OR
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
All States
Tort
Tort
Tort
Add-on
Tort
Add-on
Tort
Tort
Tort
Tort
Tort
Tort
Add-on
Tort
Tort
Tort
Tort
Tort
Tort
Tort
Tort
Tort
Tort
Add-on
Tort
Add-on
Add-on
Tort
Add-on
Tort
Add-on
Add-on
Tort
Tort
Tort
37.0%
24.2
52.6
43.5
51.7
51.0
38.9
42.0
43.2
50.1
59.6
50.6
54.9
46.1
42.0
51.6
38.9
53.5
43.4
49.3
44.8
47.8
47.5
43.8
41.5
53.0
51.5
37.3
51.6
42.2
48.6
51.8
56.1
51.4
46.1
48.8%
18.8%
15.0
36.9
25.3
33.5
36.2
23.5
23.2
26.0
28.0
40.8
30.6
36.9
26.2
24.5
29.9
21.6
36.0
26.6
31.1
30.1
28.9
27.9
29.4
27.3
36.0
28.4
20.1
33.6
22.8
32.4
35.3
35.4
30.5
22.7
30.6%
$171
24
504
162
3,257
107
57
742
431
192
500
112
635
143
372
62
90
176
102
147
616
848
247
260
94
376
45
238
1,485
36
590
561
207
414
25
$14,028
* Assumes 50% switch
passenger auto insurance (excluding commercial vehicles), for every
state currently operating under either the tort system alone or the tort
system with "add-on" provisions. 5 No-fault states that restrict the
25. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, supra note 22, at 41. "Add-on" plans are similar to
no-fault plans in that an injured party can be compensated from his or her own insurer for
economic losses without regard to anyone's fault or lack thereof, but without limiting the
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right to sue in tort unless losses are incurred above defined thresholds
are, as indicated above, not included.
As can be seen from Table 1, PIP buyers would realize significant
savings on personal auto insurance premiums. For insureds who
switch to PIP, savings of over 30% on total premiums would be
achieved nationally.26 Indeed, PIP buyers would save on the order of
20-40% in state after state.27 Using Maryland as an example of an
Eastern "add-on" state, and cumulating the totals for both those who
do and do not purchase collision and comprehensive coverages,28 we
estimate savings of 36.9% in total premiums for those who choose
PIP,29 and savings of 54.9% for those motorists who buy only
mandatory coverages. 3 ' The latter group includes generally lower in-
come motorists without collision and comprehensive coverages.
These savings assume that 50% of insureds switch to PIP. If 100% of
insureds switch to PIP, the percentage savings remain pretty much the
same with a total of $635 million in premium savings achieved in
Maryland.3 1 Similarly, using California as an example of a large West
Coast tort state, we estimate total premium savings for PIP buyers of
33.5%,32 and savings of 51.7% for lower income drivers,3 again based
on 50% of all insureds switching to PIP. If 100% switch, a total of
almost $3.3 billion in annual premium savings would be achieved. 4
As a further example, this time from a medium-sized Midwest tort
state, Wisconsin, we estimate total savings for those who choose PIP of
30.5% 3' and savings of 51.4% for those purchasing only mandatory
coverages, 36 again on the basis of 50% switching to PIP. If 100%
right to claim in tort for noneconomic losses. As to commercial vehicles, see supra note 17.
See also supra note 10.
26. Table 1, supra, Row All States, Col. 2 (the table assumes 50% of motorists will switch
to PIP).
27. Table 1, supra, Col. 2.
28. Collision and comprehensive are complementary physical damage coverages paya-
ble by one's own insurer without regard to fault. KEETON & O'CoNNELL, supra note 16, at
572. Collision covers damage to one's car resulting from collision with any other object or
upset. Comprehensive is a catch-all provision affording coverage for damage to one's car
caused by a variety of perils other than collision or upset; for example, theft, falling objects,
fire, wind, hail, glass breakage, and vandalism. Id.
29. Table 2, infra, Row Md., Col. 2.
30. Id., Col. 1. As to the percentage savings if 100% switch, see Table 3, infra, Cols. 5
and 6; see also infra note 1 to Appendix A.
31. Table 2, infra, Row Md., Col. 3.
32. Id., Row Ca., Col. 2.
33. Id., Col. 1.
34. Id., Col. 3.
35. Id., Row Wi., Col. 2.
36. Id., Col. 1.
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switch to PIP, Wisconsin motorists would yield $414 million in annual
premium savings.
Savings in the 20-40% range for total auto insurance premiums
are, of course, remarkably high-,-especially because they stem from
savings in the 55-70% range for personal injury premiums.3 8 Yet such
estimates are arguably conservative. For example, because of data lim-
itations," we did not consider the effect of making PIP coverage ex-
cess to private health insurance benefits, publicly mandated sources
such as Medicare, Medicaid, workers' compensation, and private sick
leave or disability coverages for wage loss.' Furthermore, premium
reductions based on owning safer cars-brought about by the propo-
sal's first party insurance character-should yield lower injury rates
per accident. In addition, because motorists will have less incentive to
incur medical bills and wage loss to inflate claims for pain and suffer-
ing,41 those who opt for PIP will have less incentive to pursue personal
injury claims or to utilize medical treatment. However, RAND's esti-
mates do not include this last factor in their primary findings, because
its data lacks a means of precisely weighing reductions resulting from
this drop in incentives.4"
C. Effects on the Poor
The especially disastrous effects of high auto insurance rates on
the poor can hardly be overemphasized. For example, a recent edito-
rial in an African-American Philadelphia newspaper illustrates the
problem in terms which apply to most urban areas in the United
States:
If you just listened to the candidates jocking [sic] for
election in November, you would easily think that the only
issue of importance is crime because all the candidates talk
about is who will be the "toughest" on criminals.
37. Id., Col. 3.
38. See Table 2, infra, Cols. 5 and 7. Note that we assume no change in premiums for
losses to property. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
39. See O'Connell et al., supra note 1, at 1054-62.
40. See supra text accompanying note 14.
41. O'Connell &Joost, supra note 7, at 70-72.
42. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 1, at 16-17. However, RAND has detailed alternate
hypotheses, each with a benefit level of $15,000 and a strong verbal threshold, wherein
they assume the elimination of payment for pain and suffering will reduce both the size
and number of claims. Id. at 224-31. Under this assumption, insurers in tort states that
change to a no-fault system would realize an additional 4% reduction in costs over and
above the estimated 22% reduction, assuming the size and number of claims remains the
same. Id.
1995]
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There is one issue that impacts more Philadelphians
than all of the crimes committed in any given month and
that is the (criminal) auto insurance rates Philadelphians are
forced to pay simply because they live within the city.
Because state law mandates that motor vehicle owners
must have insurance to drive those vehicles and because
many Philadelphians are required to pay auto insurance
rates far in excess of the value of the vehicles they drive,
many Philadelphians are committing a crime because they
are driving without the legally required auto insurance.
Curiously, none of these tough on crime candidates is
addressing the issue of usurious auto insurance rates which
has turned thousands of otherwise law abiding Philadelphi-
ans into criminals. Many city residents see a better option in
becoming petty criminals than impoverishing themselves by
paying the highest auto insurance rates in the nation.
Candidates need to get real and use their clout to assist
reforming auto insurance laws which force decent citizens to
become criminals.43
As Table 1 indicates, savings under the choice plan mirror pro-
gressive taxation in that its premium reductions will be proportion-
ately higher for the poor. This results from freeing PIP insureds from
any obligation to buy supplementary BI liability insurance-a freedom
that those having few or no assets to protect will embrace. In this
regard, RAND's estimates are again, conservative. They are based on
the premise that anyone choosing PIP coverage would also purchase
supplementary BI coverage at the same BI limits at which they had
bought under the traditional tort system. For former tort insureds
who had bought liability coverage to protect their assets, that assump-
tion would be correct. But many low income motorists with no or few
assets previously bought BI coverage only to comply with their state's
financial responsibility laws. It is unlikely that these motorists would
purchase supplementary BI coverage under a choice system that gives
them the option not to do so."
Thus, it is useful to note the significant positive impact of the
choice plan on the fragile financial status of low income motorists.
Because earners with no or low income can little afford discretionary
spending, each dollar of savings on auto insurance can be spent di-
rectly on necessities like food and shelter that otherwise were sacri-
ficed to pay for compulsory auto insurance. Currently, if less affluent
43. PHILADELPHIA TRIBUNE, Oct. 21, 1994, at 6A.
44. See O'Connell et al., supra note 1, at 1058 n.90.
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motorists insure at all, they may spend over thirty percent 45 of their
annual household income on auto insurance.4 Indeed, many less af-
fluent motorists are in fact forced to delay buying basic necessities in
order to pay their premiums. 47 For example, a recent study of low
income insured motorists of Maricopa County, Arizona, found that
forty-four percent were forced at some point to postpone buying food
in order to pay their auto insurance premium,48 forcing them to
choose between putting food on the table or complying with the law.
In addition to consuming an exorbitant amount of a less affluent
motorist's income, the relatively prohibitive cost of auto insurance po-
tentially has other dire effects. All states have some form of a
mandatory coverage or financial responsibility law. Financially
strapped individuals who rely on their vehicles for transportation to
work may be forced to give up their driving privileges because of their
inability to afford auto insurance. 49 The loss of driving privileges may,
in turn, result in the loss of employment and propel poorer motorists
into further impoverishment and dependency on publicly funded sup-
port. Even small savings in premiums may provide the margin the less
affluent need to keep bills paid. Thus, the large premium savings esti-
mated by RAND under the PIP plan would increase the percentage of
household income available to the less affluent for basic needs.
Moreover, the less affluent not only pay a huge percentage of
their household income for auto insurance, but also may pay signifi-
cantly more for insurance in absolute terms. Many poorer motorists
reside in urban areas where average personal auto insurance premi-
ums are often more than twice as high as premiums of suburban driv-
ers.50 For example, the average annual premium charged in 1994 by
one insurer for minimum liability coverage in Los Angeles, California
was $811, while the same coverage in Northridge, California was only
45. ROBERT L. MARIL, THE IMPACT OF MANDATORY AUTO INSURANCE UPON LOW INCOME
RESIDENTS OF MAmCOPA COUNTY, ARIZONA 8-9, 11 (1993). Robert Maril is an associate pro-
fessor in the sociology department at Oklahoma State University.
46. See Gerald D. Stephens, Please, No More Complaints, BEsT's REVIEW: PROP./CAS. ED.,
Jan. 1991, at 61, 83 (predicting that the number of uninsured motorists will exceed 75% if
premiums continue to rise, and noting the built-in unfairness of the tort system when neg-
ligent defendants have no insurance or assets to satisfy judgments against them). See also
infra note 18 to Appendix B.
47. MArnE, supra note 45, at 11.
48. Id.
49. But see U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, supra note 22, at 120 (rejecting this argu-
ment on the basis that insurance premiums are a small expense compared to the expense
of an automobile. But in rebuttal to that, compare the often nominal cost of very old, but
still operative, automobiles with still very high liability insurance costs for such autos.).
50. Id. at 67.
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$578.51 Similarly, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, average annual minimum
liability premiums in 1994 were $367, but only $213 in Waukesha.52
Premium savings in the 50% range can have an especially substantial
effect on the less affluent in both absolute dollars and percentage of
household income saved. Those savings, in turn, can affect substan-
tially the overall standard of living of the less affluent.
In addition, PIP coverage, which provides for more rapid benefit
payments than does today's more adversarial tort system, is especially
important to low income drivers. Less affluent drivers, who lack in-
dependent resources to cover the cost of their accidents, are often
compelled under tort law to accept low settlements out of their need
for immediate cash awards of even modest dimensions. An insurance
system based on proof of injury, rather than the harder-to-prove negli-
gence of the putative injurer, is thus highly progressive in character.
Finally, on the subject of the poor, this proposal also represents
another corrective to the regressive nature of today's third-party auto
insurance system. Under today's third-party auto insurance, your in-
surance company, in rating you, only takes account of the likelihood
that you will be involved in an accident. It does not take account of
your likely recovery once an accident occurs. This is so because your
insurance company will pay not you but rather the unknown person
you may injure in a future accident. As a result, the poor (along with
the young) are charged very high rates, despite the fact that when they
are in accidents, their losses are comparatively small. They suffer less
wage loss compared to others, for example. Under present auto insur-
ance, it is as though everyone was charged for fire insurance solely on
the basis of how likely it was that a fire would start on one's property,
with no consideration being given to the value of the house. Thus,
under auto insurance, the poor, along with those with middle in-
comes, have to pay into the insurance pool the same as the rich for a
given level of coverage, even though they stand to draw much less
than the rich from the pool. But with first-party insurance, all of a
sudden the less affluent would at least get credit for the advantageous
aspect of their risks that their losses are likely to be smaller. Keep in
mind, too, that it is the poor who seem least likely to pursue a tort
remedy and who therefore generally derive the least benefit from the
tort system. In the words of H. Laurence Ross, a sociologist who stud-
ied the tort liability system:
51. Data supplied by State Farm Insurance Companies (on file with .author).
52. Id.
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[T]ort law in action may ... be termed inequitable. It is
responsive to a wide variety of influences that are not de-
fined as legitimate by common standards of equity. The in-
terviews and observations I conducted convinced me that the
negotiated settlement rewards the sophisticated claimant
and penalizes the inexperienced, the naive, the simple, and
the indifferent. Translating these terms into social statutes, I
believe that the settlement produces relatively more for the
affluent, the educated, the white, and the city-dweller. It pe-
nalizes the poor, the uneducated, the [African-American and
the rural dweller] . . ..
III. DETERRENCE
Will substitution of PIP coverage for traditional tort liability
lessen the deterrent effect that traditional tort liability has on unsafe
conduct, thereby increasing costs? RAND's calculations assume no
such effect. In support of that conclusion, substituting PIP for tort
liability will create offsetting incentives.' For example, negligent mo-
torists will absorb or "internalize" less of their loss than under tradi-
tional tort law because they recover even if they cause accidents and
53. H. LAURENCE Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 241-42 (1970). Consider the following table from the most compre-
hensive study of payment to auto accident victims, done in the 1960s:
Table 3.25. Relationship of Family Income to Serious Injury and Fatality
(Automobile] Cases, to Retention of Counsel,
and to [Compensation] ... Received.
(1) (2) (3)
Family Percent Ratio of Net Reparations
Income Retaining Counsel to Economic Loss
Under $5,000 30.0 0.38
$5,000 - 9,999 36.7 0.52
$10,000 and over 41.9 0.61
Total 35.0 0.49
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsp., ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE INJURIES 54 (1970) (Au-
tomobile Insurance and Compensation Study). The compensation received figures in-
cluded both tort and nontort sources, with "'[a]bout one-third' of recovery [for bodily
injury and property damage] from tort" Id. at 2.
54. See Richard A. Epstein, Automobile No-Fault Plans: A Second Look at First Principles, 13
CREIGHTON L. REv. 769, 785 (1980) (arguing that "[any shift in the various rules of liability
... will create offsetting incentives"). See also O'Connell et al., supra note 1, at 1040-41
(arguing in accord with the text at supra note 24 that under first party insurance, such as
PIP, insurers can create incentives when they offer lower premiums for safer cars because
the savings accrue to their insureds and not to third parties). See generay O'Connell &
Joost, supra note 7, at 87 n.72 (discussing the effect of a choice system on unsafe driving).
But see Gary Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?,
42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 393-97 (1994).
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they will not be liable for pain and suffering. Conversely, those same
motorists will internalize more costs because their insurers pay for
losses even though they were not at fault and because they cannot
recover for their own pain and suffering.
Quite apart from the effects of insurance in muting motorists'
responsibility for tortious conduct under traditional tort liability, un-
safe driving is not deterred by a single influence; rather it is affected
by a combination of criminal, civil, and tort sanctions, and, arguably
above all, by one's interest in preservation of one's own body and
property.55 Thus, under PIP, all elements of deterrence but one re-
main unchanged, and even the influence of civil sanctions are trans-
formed but not eliminated. Finally, as indicated above, by reducing
the relative cost of driving safer cars the plan should, at the margin,
necessarily increase the use of such safer cars. Thus, the plan should
generate affirmative market incentives that should, in turn, enhance
the overall safety of driving automobiles.56
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, the merits of allowing motorists to opt out of payment for
pain and suffering and other noneconomic loss, in return for lower
costs and receipt of automatic payment for economic loss, are worthy
of consideration in every state.5 7
55. KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 16, at 373 & n.31.
56. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
57. For a study echoing points made herein, emphasizing the necessity of combining
PIP payments with the concomitant elimination of claims for pain and suffering as a means
of controlling auto insurance costs, seeJ. David Cummins & Sharon Tennyson, Controlling
Automobile Insurance Costs, 6J. ECON. PERSP. 95 (1992); see also Kevin Eastman et al., The New
York Verbal Threshold for Third-Party Liability under No-fault Insurance, 12 J. INs. REG. 369
(1994).
Note that the choice device could also be adapted in a state already having no-fault
insurance by providing for choice of waiver of claims for noneconomic loss applicable
when the tort threshold is exceeded. A forthcoming article by the authors will replicate
the study contained herein with cost estimates for no-fault states making this change, cou-
pled with draft bill language. See also O'Connell & Joost, supra note 7, at 80-81; Jeffrey
O'Connell, A Model Bill (and Commentay Thereon) Allowing Choice of Coverage Under Michigan
No-Fault Auto Insurance Law, 17J. LEGIS. 155 (1991).
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APPENDIX A: TABLES AND TREE CHARTS
What follows is further documentation of RAND data, supporting
and expanding on the foregoing material, with scenarios for 50% and
100% of motorists choosing PIP.' The 100% assumption obviously ap-
plies to both a choice plan and a mandatory plan. The following data
includes personal auto insurance premium data for all 35 states with-
out no-fault laws, with the three states mentioned-Maryland, Califor-
nia, and Wisconsin-each highlighted in detail.
Included for Maryland, California and Wisconsin are tree charts
that illustrate how we computed the data, accompanied by explana-
tory notes for each figure on the tree charts. Also included are addi-
tional tables providing more of both the input and output figures for
and from the tree charts. By using either the Maryland, California or
Wisconsin example, corresponding data, including tree charts and ta-
bles, can be readily formulated for each of the remaining 32 listed
states.
1. It will be noted in Table 2, infra (Cols. (5) and (7)) and Table 3, infra (Cols.
(1) (2) (5) and (6)) that the savings for PIP insureds are slightly higher with 50% of motor-
ists PIP insureds than with 100%. The reason is bottomed on the fact that a PIP insured
must pay the economic loss of the person he tortiously injures above that person's PIP or
tort maintenance coverage. See supra main text accompanying notes 11-13. With that
premise, RAND assumes that motorists who stay in the tort system will buy tort mainte-
nance coverage at the same limits that they buy coverage under the present tort system,
with many motorists today buying more than the state financial responsibility limits. On
the other hand, RAND assumes that motorists will buy only the minimum PIP insurance
limits-which is consistent with what PIP insureds do today in no-fault states. Thus the
exposure of PIP insureds to tort payment for economic loss above their victims' first-party
limits would be somewhat higher as more motorists are insured for PIP.
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TABLE 2: TREE CHART INPUT DATA
(1)* (2)* (3)* (4) (5) (6) (7)
Percent of
Collision and Liability column (3) PI premium PI premium P1 premium
Total Comprehensive Premium that is savings for savings for savings if
Premium Premium Total Total Personal Injury switchers if stayers if 100%
State (S millions) (S millions) ($ millions) (PI) Premium 50% switch 50% switch switch**
AL $ 1,039
AK 189
AZ 1,410
AR 655
CA 9,822
DE 322
ID 251
IL 3,348
IN 1,685
IA 740
LA 1,251
ME 370
MD 1,922
MS 597
MO 1,532
MT 214
NE 440
NV 502
NH 435
NM 478
NC 2,076
OH 3,134
OK 932
OR 994
RI 400
SC 1,207
SD 167
TN 1,317
TX 5,031
Vr 177
VA 2,060
WA 1,640
WV 603
WI 1,384
WY 116
AD States 48,440
$511 8528
72 117
420 990
274 381
3,463 6,359
93 229
99 152
1,495 1,853
670 1,015
326 414
395 856
146 224
630 1,292
257 340
641 891
90 124
196 244
164 338
169 266
176 302
683 1,393
1,238 1,896
385 547
327 667
137 263
388 819
75 92
607 710
1,756 3,275
81 96
688 1,372
524 1,116
222 381
562 822
59 57
18,018 30,422
69.0% 53.6%
71.0 34.1
82.0 64.1
67.0 65.0
81.0 63.9
79.0 64.5
71.0 54.7
71.0 59.1
66.0 65.5
71.0 70.6
82.0 72.7
70.0 72.3
78.0 70.4
73.0 63.2
65.0 64.7
72.0 71.7
70.0 55.6
83.0 64.4
72.0 60.3
78.0 63.2
71.0 63.1
72.0 66.4
71.0 67.0
77.0 57.0
78.0 53.2
72.0 73.7
74.0 69.6
68.0 54.9
75.0 68.8
71.0 59.4
75.0 64.8
79.0 65.6
78.0 71.9
74.0 69.4
72.0 64.1
n/a 64.9
* National Association of Insurance Commissioners, December 1993
** See supra note 1 to Appendix A.
-2.4%
-4.7
0.2
4.2
2.0
-4.9
2.6
3.2
5.1
-3.4
6.7
3.3
-3.9
-3.5
5.1
2.7
3.3
2.8
-4.8
4.5
6.7
-1.2
0.3
-3.7
-3.9
-5.3
1.8
-0.1
-3.1
-3.4
-3.6
1.4
2.5
3.3
1.8
0.6
47.0%
28.8
62.1
63.5
63.2
59.4
52.4
56.4
64.4
65.3
71.3
71.6
63.0
57.4
64.2
69.0
53.0
62.7
53.0
62.3
62.3
62.1
63.7
50.6
45.8
63.7
65.9
49.3
60.5
53.5
57.4
63.7
69.5
68.0
60.6
61.3
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TABLE 3: TREE CHART OUTPUT DATA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
50% Switch to PIP 100% Switch to PIP*
% Total Premium % Total Premium % Total Premium
Savings for Switchers Savings for Stayers Savings for Switchers
Mandatory Higher Mandatory Higher Mandatory Higher
State Coverage Coverage Coverage Coverage Coverage Coverage
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
DE
ID
IL
IN
IA
LA
ME
MD
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NM
NC
OH
OK
OR
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
Al States
37.0%
24.2
52.6
43.5
51.7
51.0
38.9
42.0
43.2
50.1
59.6
50.6
54.9
46.1
42.0
51.6
38.9
53.5
43.4
49.3
44.8
47.8
47.5
43.8
41.5
53.0
51.5
37.3
51.6
42.2
48.6
51.8
56.1
51.4
46.1
48.8
16.1%
13.3
33.6
22.2
30.0
33.0
20.7
20.2
23.0
24.4
36.9
27.0
33.3
22.9
21.5
26.2
18.8
32.5
23.5
27.7
27.1
25.6
24.5
26.5
24.5
32.5
24.7
17.5
30.1
19.8
29.1
31.9
31.6
26.9
19.4
27.3
-1.6%
-3.3
0.2
2.8
1.6
-3.9
1.8
2.3
3.4
-2.4
5.5
2.3
-3.1
-2.5
3.3
1.9
2.3
2.3
-3.5
3.5
4.7
-0.9
0.2
-2.9
-3.0
-3.8
1.3
-0.1
-2.3
-2.4
-2.7
1.1
2.0
2.4
1.3
0.4
-0.7%
-1.8
0.1
1.4
0.9
-2.5
1.0
1.1
1.8
-1.2
3.4
1.2
-1.9
-1.3
1.7
1.0
1.1
1.4
-1.9
2.0
2.9
-0.5
0.1
-1.7
-1.8
-2.4
0.6
0.0
-1.4
-1.1
-1.6
0.7
1.1
1.3
0.6
0.2
32.4%
20.4
50.9
42.6
51.2
46.9
37.2
40.1
42.5
46.3
58.4
50.1
49.1
41.9
41.8
49.7
37.0
52.0
38.2
48.6
44.3
44.7
45.3
39.0
35.7
45.9
48.8
33.5
45.3
38.0
43.0
50.3
54.2
50.4
43.6
46.1
14.2%
11.2
32.5
21.7
29.7
30.4
19.9
19.3
22.6
22.6
36.2
26.8
29.8
20.8
21.3
25.2
17.9
31.6
20.7
27.4
26.8
23.9
23.3
23.6
21.0
28.1
23.4
15.7
26.4
17.8
25.8
30.9
30.5
26.3
18.4
25.8
* See supra note 1 to Appendix A.
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NOTES FOR TREE CHART A
Relative Savings in Maryland if 50 % Switch
* All dollars figures are in millions
Al. Total 1992 personal auto insurance premiums for Maryland:
$1,922. Table 2, Col. 1.
A2. Total premiums for collision and comprehensive (CC) for Mary-
land: $630. Table 2, Col. 2. Collision and comprehensive are
complementary physical damage coverages. Collision covers au-
tomobile damage resulting from either collision with any other
object or upset. Comprehensive is a catch-all provision covering
for damage caused by a variety of perils other than collision or
upset, such as theft, falling objects, fire, wind, hail, glass break-
age, and vandalism.
A3. Total liability premiums (personal injury (PI) plus property
damage (PD) liability): $1,292. Table 2, Col. 3.
A4. The assumption here is that 50% of insured motorists will switch
to PIP.
A5. Total premiums for CC coverages for insured motorists who
switch to PIP or retain tort: $630, supra note A2, multiplied by
50%, supra note A4, equal $315.
A6. The ratio of PI liability premiums to property damage (PD) lia-
bility premiums is 78 to 22. See Table 2, Col. 4; 22 is the remain-
ing percentage (100% - 78% = 22%).
A7. Total premiums for PI liability: $1,292, supra note A3, multi-
plied by 78%, supra note A6, equals $1008.
A8. Total premiums for PD liability: $1,292, supra note A3, multi-
plied by 22%, supra note A6, equals $284.
A9. RAND assumed that 75% of insured motorists carry higher than
mandatory coverage and that 25% carry only mandatory
coverage.
A10. Total premiums for PD liability for insured motorists with
higher than mandatory coverage: $284, supra note A8, multi-
plied by 75%, supra note A9, equals $213.
Al1. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage: $284, supra note AS, multiplied
by 25%, supra note A9, equals $71.
A12. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for insured motorists
with higher than mandatory coverage who either switch to PIP
or retain tort: $213, supra note A10, multiplied by 50%, supra
note A4, equals $106.5.
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A13. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage who either switch to PIP or retain
tort: $71, supra note All, multiplied by 50%, supra note A4,
equals $35.5.
A14. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with higher than mandatory coverage: $1008, supra note A7,
multiplied by 75%, supra note A9, equals $756.
A15. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage: $1008, supra note A7, multi-
plied by 25%, supra note A9, equals $252.
A16. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with higher than mandatory coverage who switch to PIP or re-
tain tort: $756, supra note A14, multiplied by 50%, supra note
A4, equals $378.
A17. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage who either switch to PIP or re-
tain tort: $252, supra note A15, multiplied by 50%, supra note
A4, equals $126.
A18. Percentage of PI liability coverage premium savings for insured
motorists who switch to PIP equals 70.4%. Table 2, Col. 5.
A19. Total premium multiple for PI liability coverage for insured
motorists who switch to PIP: 100% minus 70.4%, supra note
A18, equals 29.6%.
A20. Percentage of PI liability coverage premium savings for insured
motorists who retain tort equals -3.9%. Table 2, Col. 6.
A21. Total premium multiple for PI liability coverage for insured
motorists who retain tort: 100% minus -3.9%, supra note A20,
equals 103.9%.
A22. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for in-
sured motorists with higher than mandatory coverage who
switch to PIP: $378, supra note A16, multiplied by 70.4%, supra
note A18, equals $266.1.
A23. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with higher than mandatory coverage who switch to PIP with
higher than mandatory coverage: $378, supra note A16, multi-
plied by 29.6%, supra note A19, equals $111.9.
A24. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for motor-
ists with higher than mandatory coverage who retain tort:
$378, supra note A16, multiplied by -3.9%, supra note A20,
equals -$14.7.
A25. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for motorists with
higher than mandatory coverage who retain tort with higher
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than mandatory coverage: $378, supra note A16, multiplied by
103.9%, supra note A21, equals $392.7.
A26. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for in-
sured motorists with only mandatory coverage who switch to
PIP: $126, supra note A17, multiplied by 70.4%, supra note
A18, equals $88.7.
A27. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage who switch to PIP: $126, supra
note A17, multiplied by 29.6%, supra note A19, equals $37.3.
A28. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for motor-
ists with only mandatory coverage who retain tort with only
mandatory coverage: $126, supra note A17, multiplied by
-3.9%, supra note A20, equals -$4.9.
A29. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for motorists with only
mandatory coverage who retain tort: $126, supra note A17,
multiplied by 103.9%, supra note A21, equals $130.9.
A30. The total percentage of savings for insured motorists who
switch to PIP with higher than mandatory coverage (including
collision and comprehensive, PI liability, and PD liability cover-
ages) equals 33.3%. Table 3, Col. 2.
A31. The total percentage of savings for insured motorists who
switch to PIP with only mandatory coverage equals 54.9%. Ta-
ble 3, Col. 1.
A32. The total percentage of savings for insured motorists who re-
tain tort with higher than mandatory coverage equals -1.9%.
Table 3, Col. 4.
A33. The total percentage of savings for insured motorists who re-
tain tort with only mandatory coverage equals -3.1%. Table 3,
Col. 3.
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NOTES FOR TREE CHART B
Relative Savings in Maryland if 100% Switch
* All dollars figures are in millions
B1. Total 1992 personal auto insurance premiums for Maryland:
$1,922. Table 2, Col. 1.
B2. Total premiums for collision and comprehensive (CC) for Mary-
land: $630. Table 2, Col. 2. See supra note A2.
B3. Total liability premiums (personal injury (PI) plus property
damage (PD) liability): $1,292. Table 2, Col. 3.
B4. The assumption here is that 100% of insured motorists will
switch to PIP.
B5. All figures on the tort branches will be zero because of the as-
sumption that all insured motorists will switch to PIP-no in-
sured motorists retain tort.
B6. Total premiums for CC coverages for insured motorists: $630,
supra note B2, multiplied by 100%, supra note B4, equals $630.
B7. The ratio of PI liability premiums to PD liability premiums is 78
to 22. See Table 2, Col. 4; 22 is the remaining percentage (100%
- 78% = 22%).
B8. Total premiums for PI liability: $1,292, supra note B3, multi-
plied by 78%, supra note B7, equals $1,008.
B9. Total premiums for PD liability: $1,292, supra note B3, multi-
plied by 22%, supra note B7, equals $284.
110. RAND assumed that 75% of insured motorists carry higher than
mandatory coverage and that 25% carry only mandatory cover-
age for all states.
B1. Total premiums for PD liability for insured motorists with higher
than mandatory coverage: $284, supra note B9, multiplied by
75%, supra note B10, equals $213.
B12. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage: $284, supra note B9, multiplied
by 25%, supra note BIO, equals $71.
B13. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for insured motorists
with higher than mandatory coverage: $213, supra note BlIl,
multiplied by 100%, supra note B4, equals $213.
B14. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage: $71, supra note B12, multiplied
by 100%, supra note B4, equals $71.
B15. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with higher than mandatory coverage: $1,008, supra note B8,
multiplied by 75%, supra note BIO, equals $756.
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B16. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage: $1,008, supra note B8, multi-
plied by 25%, supra note B1O, equals $252.
B17. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with higher than mandatory coverage where all insureds switch
to PIP: $756, supra note B15, multiplied by 100%, supra note
B4, equals $756.
B18. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage where all insureds switch to PIP:
$252, supra note B16, multiplied by 100%, supra note B4, equals
$252.
B19. Percentage of premium savings for PI liability coverage equals
63%. Table 2, Col. 7.
B20. Total premium multiple for PI liability coverage for insured
motorists: 100%, minus 63%, supra note B19, equals 37%.
B21. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for in-
sured motorists with higher than mandatory coverage: $756,
supra note B17, multiplied by 63%, supra note B19, equals
$476.3.
B22. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with higher than mandatory coverage: $756, supra note B17,
multiplied by 37%, supra note B20, equals $279.7.
B23. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for motor-
ists with only mandatory coverage: $252, supra note B18, multi-
plied by 63%, supra note B19, equals $158.8.
B24. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage: $252, supra note B18, multi-
plied by 37%, supra note B20, equals $93.2.
B25. The total percentage of savings for insured motorists with
higher than mandatory coverage (including collision and com-
prehensive, PI liability, and PD liability coverages) equals
29.8%. Table 3, Col. 6.
B26. The total percentage of savings for insured motorists with only
mandatory coverage equals 49.1%. Table 3, Col. 5.
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NOTES FOR TREE CHART C
Relative Savings in Calfornia if 50% Switch
* All dollars figures are in millions
C1. Total 1992 personal auto insurance premiums for California:
$9,822. Table 2, Col. 1.
C2. Total premiums for CC for California: $3,463. Table 2, Col. 2.
See supra note A2.
C3. Total liability premiums (personal injury [PI] plus property
damage [PD] liability): $6,359. Table 2, Col. 3.
C4. The assumption here is that 50% of insured motorist will switch
to PIP.
C5. Total premiums for CC coverages for insured motorists who
switch to PIP or retain tort: $3,363, supra note C2, multiplied by
50%, supra note C4, equals $1,731.5.
C6. The ratio of PI liability premiums to PD liability premiums is 81
to 19. See Table 2, Col. 4; 19 is the remaining percentage (100%
- 81% = 19%).
C7. Total premiums for PI liability: $6,359, supra note C3, multi-
plied by 81%, supra, note C6, equals $5,151.
C8. Total premiums for PD liability: $6,359, supra note C3, multi-
plied by 19%, supra note C6, equals $1,208.
C9. RAND assumed that 75% of insured motorists carry higher than
mandatory coverage and that 25% carry only mandatory cover-
age for all states.
CIO. Total premiums for PD liability for insured motorists with
higher than mandatory coverage: $1,208, supra note C8, multi-
plied by 75%, supra note C9, equals $906.
Cll. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage: $1,208, supra note C8, multi-
plied by 25%, supra note C9, equals $302.
C12. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for insured motorists
with higher than mandatory coverage who either switch to PIP
or retain tort: $906, supra note CIO, multiplied by 50%, supra
note C4, equals $453.
C13. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage who either switch to PIP or retain
tort: $302, supra note ClI, multiplied by 50%, supra note C4,
equals $151.
C14. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with higher than mandatory coverage: $5,151, supra note C7,
multiplied by 75%, supra note C9, equals $3,863.
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C15. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage: $5,151, supra note C7, multi-
plied by 25%, supra note C9, equals $1,288.
C16. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with higher than mandatory coverage who either switch to PIP
or retain tort: $3,863, supra note C14, multiplied by 50%, supra
note C4, equals $1,932.
CI 7. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage who either switch to PIP or re-
tain tort: $1,288, supra note C15, multiplied by 50%, supra note
C4, equals $644.
C18. Percentage of PI liability coverage premium savings for liability
coverage for insured motorists who switch to PIP equals 63.9%.
Table 2, Col. 5.
C19. Total premium multiple for PI liability coverage for insured
motorists who switch to PIP: 100% minus 63.9%, supra note
C18, equals 36.1%.
C20. Percentage of PI liability coverage premium savings for insured
motorists who retain tort equals 2%. Table 2, Col. 6.
C21. Total premium multiple for PI liability coverage for insured
motorists who retain tort: 100% minus 2%, supra note C20,
equals 98%.
C22. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for in-
sured motorists with higher than mandatory coverage who
switch to PIP: $1,932, supra note C16, multiplied by 63.9%,
supra note C18, equals $1,234.5.
C23. Total premiums for personal injury (PI) liability coverage for
insured motorists with higher than mandatory coverage who
switch to PIP: $1,932, supra note C16, multiplied by 36.1%,
supra note C19, equals $697.5.
C24. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for motor-
ists with higher than mandatory coverage who retain tort:
$1,932, supra note C16, multiplied by 2%, supra note C20,
equals $38.6.
C25. Total premiums for personal injury (PI) liability coverage for
motorists with higher than mandatory coverage who retain cov-
erage: $1,932, supra note C16, multiplied by 98%, supra note
C21, equals $1,893.4.
C26. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for in-
sured motorists with only mandatory coverage who switch to
PIP: $644, supra note C17, multiplied by 63.9%, supra note
C18, equals $411.5.
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C27. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage who switch to PIP: $644, supra
note C17, multiplied by 36.1%, supra note C19, equals $232.5.
C28. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for motor-
ists with only mandatory coverage who retain tort: $644, supra
note C17, multiplied by 2%, supra note C20, equals $12.9.
C29. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for motorists with only
mandatory coverage who retain tort: $644, supra note C17,
multiplied by 98%, supra note C21, equals $631.1.
C30. The total percentage of savings for insured motorists who
switch to PIP with higher than mandatory coverage (including
collision and comprehensive, PI liability, and PD liability cover-
ages) equals 30%. Table 3, Col. 2.
C31. The total percentage of savings for insured motorists who
switch to PIP with only mandatory coverage equals 51.7%. Ta-
ble 3, Col. 1.
C32. The total percentage of savings for insured motorists who re-
tain tort with higher than mandatory coverage equals 0.9%.
Table 3, Col. 4.
C33. The total percentage of savings for insured motorists who re-
tain tort with only mandatory coverage equals 1.6%. Table 3,
Col. 3.
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NOTES FOR TREE CHART D
Relative Savings in Calfornia if 100% Switch
* All dollars figures are in millions
Dl. Total 1992 personal auto insurance premiums for California:
$9,822. Table 2, Col. 1.
D2. Total premiums for collision and comprehensive (CC) for Cali-
fornia: $3,463. Table 2, Col. 2. See supra note A2.
D3. Total liability premiums (personal injury (PI) plus property
damage (PD) liability) for California: $6,359. Table 2, Col. 3.
D4. The assumption here is that 100% of insured motorists will
switch to PIP.
D5. All figures on the tort branches will be zero because of the as-
sumption that all insured motorists will switch to PIP-no in-
sured motorists retain tort.
D6. Total premiums for CC coverages for insured motorists: $3,463,
supra note D2, multiplied by 100%, supra note D4, equals
$3,463.
D7. The ratio of PI liability premiums to PD liability premiums is 81
to 19. See Table 2, Col. 4; 19 is the remaining percentage (100%
- 81% = 19%).
D8. Total premiums for PI liability: $6,359, supra note D3, multi-
plied by 81%, supra note D7, equals $5,151.
D9. Total premiums for PD liability: $6,359, supra note D3, multi-
plied by 19%, supra note D7, equals $1,208.
D10. RAND assumed that 75% of insured motorist carry higher than
mandatory coverage and 25% carry only mandatory coverage for
all states.
Dl1. Total premiums for PD liability for insured motorists with
higher than mandatory coverage: $1,208, supra note D9, multi-
plied by 75%, supra note D1O, equals $906.
D12. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage: $1,208, supra note D9, multi-
plied by 25%, supra note D10, equals $302.
D13. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for insured motorists
with higher than mandatory coverage: $906, supra note Dll,
multiplied by 100%, supra note D4, equals $906.
D14. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage: $302, supra note D12, multiplied
by 100%, supra note D4, equals $302.
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D15. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with higher than mandatory coverage: $5,151, supra note D8,
multiplied by 75%, supra note D10, equals $3,863.
D16. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage: $5,151, supra note D8, multi-
plied by 25%, supra note D10, equals $1,288.
D17. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with higher than mandatory coverage where all insureds switch
to PIP: $3,863, supra note D15, multiplied by 100%, supra note
D4, equals $3,863.
D18. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage where all insureds switch to PIP:
$1,288, supra note D16, multiplied by 100%, supra note D4,
equals $1,288.
D19. Percentage of premium savings for PI liability coverage for in-
sured motorists equals 63.2%. Table 2, Col. 7.
D20. Total premium multiple for PI liability coverage for insured
motorists: 100% minus 63.2%, supra note D19, equals 36.8%.
D21. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for in-
sured motorists with higher than mandatory coverage: $3,863,
supra note D17, multiplied by 63.2%, supra note D19, equals
$2,441.4.
D22. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with higher than mandatory coverage: $3,863, supra note D17,
multiplied by 36.8%, supra note D20, equals $1,421.6.
D23. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for motor-
ists with only mandatory coverage: $1,288, supra note D18,
multiplied by 63.2%, supra note D19, equals $814.
D24. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage: $1,288, supra note D18, multi-
plied by 36.8%, supra note D20, equals $474.
D25. The total percentage of savings for insured motorists with
higher than mandatory coverage (including collision and com-
prehensive, PI liability, and PD liability coverages) equals
29.7%. Table 3, Col. 6.
D26. The total percentage of savings for insured motorists with only
mandatory coverage equals 51.2%. Table 3, Col. 5.
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NoTEs FOR TREE CHART E
Relative Savings in Wisconsin if 50% Switch
* All dollars figures are in millions
El. Total 1992 personal auto insurance premiums for Wisconsin:
$1,384. Table 2, Col. 1.
E2. Total premiums for collision and comprehensive (CC) for Wis-
consin: $562. Table 2, Col. 2. See supra note A2.
E3. Total liability premiums (personal injury (PI) plus property
damage (PD) liability): $822. Table 2, Col. 3.
E4. The assumption here is that 50% of insured motorists will switch
to PIP.
E5. Total premiums for CC coverages for insured motorists who
switch to PIP or retain tort: $562, supra note E2, multiplied by
50%, supra note E4, equals $281.
E6. The ratio of PI liability premiums to PD liability premiums is 74
to 26. See Table 2, Col. 4; 26 is the remaining percentage (100%
- 74% = 26%).
E7. Total premiums for PI liability: $822, supra note E3, multiplied
by 74%, supra note E6, equals $608.
E8. Total premiums for PD liability: $822, supra note E3, multiplied
by 26%, supra note E6, equals $214.
E9. RAND assumed that 75% of insured motorists carry higher than
mandatory coverage and that 25% carry only mandatory
coverage.
ElO. Total premiums for PD liability for insured motorists with higher
than mandatory coverage: $214, supra note E8, multiplied by
75%, supra note E9, equals $160.
Ell. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage: $214, supra note E8, multiplied
by 25%, supra note E9, equals $53.
E12. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for insured motorists
with higher than mandatory coverage who either switch to PIP
or retain tort: $160, supra note ElO, multiplied by 50%, supra
note E4, equals $80.
E13. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage who either switch to PIP or retain
tort: $53, supra note Eli, multiplied by 50%, supra note E4,
equals $26.5.
E14. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with higher than mandatory coverage: $608, supra note E7, mul-
tiplied by 75%, supra note E9, equals $456.
1995] 315
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
E15. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage: $608, supra note E7, multiplied
by 25%, supra note E9, equals $152.
E16. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with higher than mandatory coverage who either switch to PIP
or retain tort: $456, supra note E14, multiplied by 50%, supra
note E4, equals $228.
E17. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage who switch to PIP or retain tort:
$152, supra note E15, multiplied by 50%, supra note E4, equals
$76.
E18. Percentage of PI liability coverage premium savings for insured
motorists who switch to PIP equals 69.4%. Table 2, Col. 5.
E19. Total premium multiple for PI liability coverage for insured
motorists who switch to PIP: 100% minus 69.4%, supra note
E18, equals 30.6%.
E20. Percentage of PI liability coverage premium savings for liability
coverage for insured motorists who retain tort equals 3.3%. Ta-
ble 2, Col. 6.
E21. Total premium multiple for PI liability coverage for insured
motorists who retain tort: 100% minus 3.3%, supra note E20,
equals 96.7%.
E22. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for in-
sured motorists with higher than mandatory coverage who
switch to PIP: $228, supra note E16, multiplied by 69.4%, supra
note E18, equals $158.2.
E23. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with higher than mandatory coverage who switch to PIP: $228,
supra note E16, multiplied by 30.6%, supra note E19, equals
$69.8.
E24. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for motor-
ists with higher than mandatory coverage who retain tort:
$228, supra note E16, multiplied by 3.3%, supra note E20,
equals $7.5.
E25. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for motorists with
higher than mandatory coverage who retain tort: $228, supra
note E16, multiplied by 96.7%, supra note E21, equals $220.5.
E26. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for in-
sured motorists with only mandatory coverage who switch to
PIP: $76, supra note E17, multiplied by 69.4%, supra note E18,
equals $52.7.
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E27. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage who switch to PIP: $76, supra
note E17, multiplied by 30.6%, supra note E19, -equals $23.3.
E28. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for motor-
ists with only mandatory coverage who retain tort: $76, supra
note E17, multiplied by 3.3%, supra note E20, equals $2.5.
E29. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for motorists with only
mandatory coverage who retain -tort: $76, supra note E17, mul-
tiplied by 96.7%, supra note E21, equals $73.5.
E30. The total percentage of savings for insured motorists with
higher than mandatory coverage who switch to PIP: (including
collision and comprehensive, PI liability, and PD liability cover-
ages) equals 26.9%. Table 3, Col. 2.
E31. The total percentage of savings for insured motorists with only
mandatory coverage who switch to PIP equals 51.4%. Table 3,
Col. 1.
E32. The total percentage of savings for insured motorists with
higher than mandatory coverage who retain tort equals 1.3%.
Table 3, Col. 4.
E33. The total percentage of savings for insured motorists who re-
tain tort with only mandatory coverage equals 2.4%.
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NoTEs FOR TREE CHART F
Relative Savings in Wisconsin if 100% Switch
* All dollars figures are in millions
Fl. Total 1992 personal auto insurance premiums for Wisconsin:
$1,384. Table 2, Col. 1.
F2. Total premiums for collision and comprehensive (CC) for Wis-
consin: $562. Table 2, Col. 2. See supra note A2.
F3. Total liability premiums (personal injury (PI) plus property dam-
age (PD) liability): $822. Table 2, Col. 3.
F4. The assumption here is that 100% of insured motorists will
switch to PIP.
F5. All figures on the tort branches will be zero because of the as-
sumption that all insured motorists will switch to PIP-no in-
sured motorists retain tort.
F6. Total premiums for CC coverages for insured motorists: $562,
supra note F2, multiplied by 100%, supra note F4, equals $562.
F7. The ratio of PI liability premiums to PD liability premiums is 74
to 26. See Table 2, Col. 4; 26 is the remaining percentage (100%
- 74% = 26%).
F8. Total premiums for PI liability: $822, supra note F3, multiplied
by 74%, supra note F7, equals $608.
F9. Total premiums for PD liability: $822, supra note F3, multiplied
by 26%, supra note F7, equals $214.
F10. RAND assumed that 75% of insured motorists carry higher than
mandatory coverage and 25% carry only mandatory coverage for
all states.
F1 1. Total premiums for PD liability for insured motorists with higher
than mandatory coverage: $214, supra note F9, multiplied by
75%, supra note FlO, equals $160.
F12. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage: $214, supra note F9, multiplied
by 25%, supra note FlO, equals $53.
F13. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for insured motorists
with higher than mandatory coverage: $160, supra note FlI,
multiplied by 100%, supra note F4, equals $160.
F14. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage: $53, supra note F12, multiplied
by 100%, supra note F4, equals $53.
F15. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with higher than mandatory coverage: $608, supra note F8, mul-
tiplied by 75%, supra note F1O, equals $456.
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F16. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage: $608, supra note F8, multiplied
by 25%, supra note F1O, equals $152.
F17. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with higher than mandatory coverage where all insureds switch
to PIP: $456, supra note F15, multiplied by 100%, supra note
F4, equals $456.
F18. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage where all insureds switch to PIP:
$152, supra note F16, multiplied by 100%, supra note F4, equals
$152.
F19. Percent of premium savings for PI liability coverage equals
68%. Table 2, Col. 7.
F20. Total premium multiple for PI liability coverage for insured
motorists: 100% minus 68%, supra note F19, equals 32%.
F21. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for in-
sured motorists with higher than mandatory coverage: $456,
supra note F17, multiplied by 68%, supra note F19, equals
$310.1.
F22. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with higher than mandatory coverage: $456, supra note F17,
multiplied by 32%, supra note F20, equals $145.9.
F23. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for motor-
ists with only mandatory coverage: $152, supra note F18, multi-
plied by 68%, supra note F19, equals $103.4.
F24. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
with only mandatory coverage: $152, supra note F18, multiplied
by 32%, supra note F20, equals $48.6.
F25. The total percentage of savings for insured motorists with
higher than mandatory coverage (including collision and com-
prehensive, PI liability, and PD liability coverages) equals
26.3%. Table 3, Col. 6.
F26. The total percentage of savings for insured motorists with only
mandatory coverage equals 50.4%. Table 3, Col. 5.
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APPENDIX B: MODEL LEGISLATION FOR CREATION OF A CONSUMER
CHOICE IN MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE ACT*
AN ACT relating to insurance; creating a system of motor vehicle insur-
ance that offers a choice of methods of protection against losses from
personal injury arising out of the maintenance or use of motor vehi-
cles; abolishing tort liability in certain cases; and providing other mat-
ters properly relating thereto:
CONSUMER CHOICE IN MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE ACT
Section 1. Title ..............................................
Section 2. Statement of Purpose .............................
Section 3. Definitions .......................................
Section 4. Insurance Requirements ..........................
Section 5. Required Limits of Liability Coverage .............
Section 6. Election of Personal Injury Protection Option or
Tort Maintenance Coverage Option ..... .........
Section 7. Application of Coverage ..........................
Section 8. Geographic Application of Personal Injury
Protection Policies ................................
Section 9. Persons Not Entitled to Personal Protection ......
Section 10. Payment of Personal Injury Protection Benefits ...
Section 11. Multiple Coverages ...............................
Section 12. Priority of Benefits ...............................
Section 13. Coordination of Benefits .........................
Section 14. Tort Rights and Legal Liability Under this Act....
Section 15. Insurer's Right of Subrogation ....................
Section 16. Personal Injury Protection Benefits and Causes of
Action for Injury .................................
Section 17. Personal Injury Protection Benefits Payable
Periodically .......................................
Section 18. Assignment or Garnishment of Personal Injury
Protection Benefits ...............................
Section 19. No Penalty for Claims for Personal Injury
Protection Benefits ...............................
Section 20. Limitation of Actions .............................
Section 21. Mental and Physical Examinations ................
Section 22. Verification of Entitlement to Benefits ............
Section 23. Assigned Claims Plan .............................
Section 24. Fraudulent Claims ................................
322
322
326
333
335
335
335
336
337
338
338
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
344
344
345
345
346
347
* This Model Legislation is authored by Jeffrey O'Connell alone. It does not
necessarily reflect the views of the co-authors of the Article's main text and Appendix A.
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Section 25. Non-Discrimination in Fees for Medical Services.. 347
Section 26. Managed Care .................................... 347
Section 27. Safety Equipment ................................ 348
Section 28. Regulations ....................................... 348
Section 29. Limitation of Liability for Advising on Options ... 349
Section 30. Cost of Living Adjustment ........................ 349
Section 31. Arbitration ....................................... 349
Section 32. Out-of-State Vehicles ............................. 349
Section 33. Terms, Conditions and Exclusions ................ 350
Section 34. Applicable Provisions to Tort Maintenance
Coverage ......................................... 350
Section 35. Severability and Constitutionality ................. 350
Section 36. Declaratory Judgment ............................ 351
Section 37. Effective Date .................................... 351
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF [NAME], REPRESENTED IN THEIR
LEGISLATURE, Do ENACT AS FOLLOWS:
SECTION 1. TITLE. This Act may be cited as the Consumer
Choice in Motor Vehicle Insurance Act.'
SECTION 2. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE.
a. Controlling Provisions. To the extent the provisions of section
2 differ from the provisions of section 3 and thereafter, the provisions
of the subsequent sections control.
b. Existing Law. Under existing law, the ability of a person to
recover losses incurred as a result of a motor vehicle accident is lim-
ited by factors over which the accident victim has no control. The
recovery is dependent on, among other things, the conduct of the
other driver, the amount of liability insurance (if any) carried by the
other driver, and the financial resources (if any) of the other driver.
Under the current system, two individuals who have received identical
injuries may recover markedly different amounts. Therefore, many
1. These footnotes are adapted from Jeffrey O'Connell, A Model Bill Allowing Choice
Between Auto Insurance Payable With and Without Regard to Fault 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 947 (1990).
That article set forth a bill based on the first variation of a choice plan discussed infra note
2 to Appendix B. As a result of the change to the second approach in O'Connell supra, the
terminology of the footnotes has been changed where appropriate. Furthermore, in order
to limit the length of this Appendix, some identifying footnotes either cross refer to
O'Connell supra, or have not been reproduced here. Any reader desiring to have the
benefit of those eliminated footnotes can, with relative ease, track them by the section
letters in the Table of Contents in O'Connell supra bearing identical, or at least similar,
section titles in the draft bill presented herein.
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individuals, particularly the large number of motorists involved in
one-car accidents, receive no compensation for their losses at all.
c. The Right to Choose. This bill gives motorists (1) the right to
choose the kinds of personal injury protection which will be available
to themselves and their family members in case of an automobile acci-
dent, and (2) the right to choose the amount of financial protection
they deem appropriate and affordable for themselves and their fami-
lies. Instead of being forced to buy traditional tort liability insurance
to protect strangers, motorists will have the opportunity to buy a new
Personal Injury Protection coverage to protect themselves and their
family members in the event of a motor vehicle accident. As an alter-
native, they will have the right to elect traditional Tort Liability Insur-
ance which will include an inverse liability coverage (entitled "Tort
Maintenance Coverage") to provide protection in the event of injury
caused by someone who has elected the Personal Injury Protection
Option.2
2. A pivotal requirement of any law allowing motorists to choose between coverages
payable with and without regard to fault is the proper allocation of benefits from the sur-
render of tort rights.
To illustrate the problem, consider the impact of the possible combinations of insur-
ance coverages in a two-car collision. (1) both vehicles could be covered by insurance
payable without regard to fault; (2) both vehicles could be covered by insurance payable
with regard to fault; or (3) one vehicle could be covered by insurance payable without
regard to fault and the other by insurance payable with regard to fault.
Resolving claims and transferring accident losses is easy for the first two coverage com-
binations. If two motorists with insurance payable without regard to fault collide, they
would recover under their respective Personal Injury Protection policies without bringing a
common law claim based on fault against each other. The term "Personal Injury Protec-
tion" is used in preference to "no-fault" throughout this bill because the latter term has
come to connote, based on statutes passed under that rubric, laws that include both bene-
fits paid without reference to fault and the preservation of full tort rights at least above a
defined threshold. For a discussion of the (sometimes confusing) terminology applicable
to various forms of automobile insurance reform whereby benefits are payable without
reference to fault, see U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsp., COMPENSATING AuTo ACCIDENT VICrIMs: A
FoLLow-UP REPORT ON NO-FAULT AUTo INSURANCE EXPERIENCES 15-18, 21-22 (1985) [here-
inafter DOT REPORT]; see alsoJeffrey O'Connell & Robert H. Joost, Giving Motorists a Choice
Between Fault and No-Fault Insurance, 72 VA. L. REv. 61, 63-64 (1986). If two motorists in-
sured under traditional insurance payable with regard to fault collide, they could claim
against each other based on fault as they do under common law rules. But resolving claims
and transferring losses is problematic for the third combination, a collision between mo-
torists insured with and without regard to fault The motorist insured without regard to
fault would recover under his or her Personal Injury Protection policy, but the traditional
insured who was not at fault in causing the accident could not recover unless he or she was
permitted to sue the other motorist based on fault. But requiring the motorist insured
without regard to fault to insure based on fault for a claim by a fault-insured while surren-
dering his or her own right to claim based on fault would obviously be unfairly prejudi-
cial-and expensive-for the motorist insured without regard to fault.
One solution would never take away tort rights in an accident involving those insuring
both with and without regard to fault. Under this system, those who choose Personal In-
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d. Tort Liability Insurance versus Personal Injury Protection
coverage.
(1) Motorists who choose the Tort Liability Insurance and who
are involved in an accident with another motorist will retain the tort
liability system, except that, based on fault, (a) they can be sued by
those who choose personal injury protection but only for damages in
excess of the limits of the Personal Injury Protection policy and (b)
they cannot claim against those who choose Personal Injury Protec-
tion coverage except for uncompensated economic loss in excess of
the limits of their own first party Tort Maintenance Coverage.
jury Protection insurance must buy tort liability coverage for claims against them by those
insured based on fault. However, because insurance without regard to fault can be ex-
pected to cost substantially less than tort liability coverage, exposure to tort liability for
personal injury protection insureds will not be all that great.
The disadvantage of this approach is that insurers cannot be sure in advance of the
percentages of drivers who will insure for traditional tort liability and those who will insure
without regard to fault As a result, reductions in premiums could conceivably be signifi-
candy less than would occur under a device in which insurers could confidently know that
no motorist insured regardless of fault will be exposed to normal liability in tort to those
electing traditional tort liability insurance.
The latter assurance can be gained by the device proposed herein for a regime al-
lowing choice between insurance regarding and regardless of fault. Under a scheme of
"inverse liability" (termed "Tort Maintenance Coverage"), in a collision between a motorist
covered by traditional tort liability and another insured regardless of fault, no normal tort
claims between the motorists would be allowed, but the driver with traditional tort liability
insurance coverage would be allowed to sue his or her own company for full tort damages
as if his or her company covered the driver insured regardless of fault. Such a regime
mirrors "uninsured motorist" coverage, extant today, which allows victims to claim dam-
ages against their own companies if the motorist with whom they collide is uninsured.
Under the proposed regime the costs of "uninsured motorist" coverage would increase,
but that increase would be offset by fewer claims against the traditional insured's tort liabil-
ity coverage because all those insured regardless of fault would be impeded in liability
claims.
A third method of dealing with the reallocation problem has been employed in N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6A-21 to -22 (West 1990). It entails a "risk exchange" to reallocate the
money saved by the motorist insured under traditional tort liability back to the motorist
insured regardless of fault. Thus, under a risk exchange, as under "inverse liability," those
insuring regardless of fault need not carry liability insurance to cover full common law
liability for those insured under traditional tort liability. But the administrability of such a
risk exchange device is subject to dispute among insurers. O'Connell, supra note 1 to
Appendix B, at 949-50 & n.8.
The fourth and worst possible solution to the reallocation problem was adopted in
Pennsylvania's bastardized choice bill, which simply ignored the need for reallocation. Act
of Feb. 7, 1990, §§ 8, 17, 1990 Pa. Laws 11 (adding 75 PA. CONs. STAT. ANN. § 1705(a)(1)
and amending § 1791.1 (b) (Supp. 1994-95)). "As a result, the cost savings of surrendering
tort rights do not accrue to the motorist surrendering the same. Instead, they accrue to
the person who was at fault in injuring him or her. That is, surrender of tort rights simply
reduces the chances of recovering in tort against the person at fault, which saves money for
the latter's insurer but not for the insurer of the motorist surrendering his or her tort
rights." O'Connell, supra note 1 to Appendix B, at 951.
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(2) Motorists who choose Personal Injury Protection coverage es-
tablished by this Act and who are involved in an accident with a mo-
torist who has chosen traditional Tort Liability Insurance will be
promptly compensated for their own losses, without regard to fault,
and can also claim against the other motorist based on fault for un-
compensated economic loss in excess of the limits of the Personal In-
jury Protection policy.
(3) Two motorists who each choose Personal Injury Protection
coverage and who are involved in an accident with each other will be
promptly compensated under their own policies for their own losses
without regard to fault. In this situation, the two motorists who have
chosen the Personal Injury Protection coverage lose the right to claim
and sue for "pain and suffering" and other noneconomic loss, but if
either suffers economic loss in excess of his/her policy's benefit levels,
that person retains the right to claim and sue for unreimbursed eco-
nomic loss based on fault.
(4) When two motorists who each choose Tort Liability Insur-
ance are involved in an accident with each other, their rights against
each other are unaffected by this Act.
(5) If a motorist who has chosen Tort Liability Insurance is in-
volved in an accident with an uninsured motorist, the policyholder
will be compensated for losses under the uninsured motorist provi-
sions of his/her own policy based on fault and has the right to sue for
damages. The uninsured motorist forfeits the right to claim for
noneconomic loss against the motorist who has chosen Tort Liability
Insurance unless the tort liability insured was driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol or illegal drugs or was guilty of intentional
misconduct.
(6) If a motorist who has chosen the Personal Injury Protection
policy is involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist, the poli-
cyholder will be promptly compensated for losses without regard to
fault under his/her Personal Injury Protection policy, and has the
right to claim and sue the uninsured motorist for damages based on
fault. The uninsured motorist forfeits the right to claim for
noneconomic loss against the motorist who has chosen the Personal
Injury Protection policy except when the Personal Injury Protection
Insured was driving under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs or
was guilty of intentional misconduct.
e. Property Damage. A motorist who purchased a Personal In-
jury Protection policy will thereby procure [$10,000] of property dam-
age liability insurance as part of his/her mandatory coverage. In
order to keep the cost of property damage liability insurance as low as
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possible, persons who have chosen Personal Injury Protection policies
have no cause of action for damage to a motor vehicle to the extent
such vehicle is insured against collision damage in accidents involving
other Personal Injury Protection Insureds.3
SECTION 3. DEFINITIONS. As used in this Act, unless the context
requires otherwise, the following terms have the meaning ascribed to
them in this section:
a. "Accidental bodily injury" means bodily injury, sickness or dis-
ease, including death resulting therefrom, arising out of the operation
or use of a motor vehicle, or while occupying such vehicle, which is
accidental as to the person injured.4
b. "Added Personal Injury Protection" means coverage for addi-
tional Personal Injury Protection. Added Personal Injury Protection
coverage includes benefits with an aggregate limit of [$100,000] per
person (including [$30,000] of Basic Personal Injury Protection bene-
fits), to consist of medical expenses, up to [$1,000] per week of loss of
income from work, up to [$300] per week of replacement services
loss, and if death is proximately and directly caused by a motor vehicle
and occurs within one year of the date of the accident, a death benefit
3. Note that under this bill, motorists electing Personal Injury Protection insurance
are not required to carry tort liability insurance for personal injury. Thus, a poorer person
with no or few assets to protect can buy only Personal Injury Protection insurance protect-
ing himself and his family for their medical bills and wage loss. This does not overly disad-
vantage those injured by the poor since the poor are so likely to be either un- or under-
insured anyway. See supra main text accompanying note 43.
Note also that because insured motorists remain liable for uncompensated economic
losses in excess of their own first party insurance or other coverages applicable to injury,
poorer persons buying only the minimum amounts of insurance will more often be able to
claim for higher losses against insureds who have purchased higher amounts of coverage
than vice versa. This can arguably be justified by considerations of income redistribution.
Cf Jeffrey O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendants'Payment for Pain and Suffering in Return
for Payment of Claimants'Attorneys'Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 333, 356-58. But even without
reference to the bill being discussed here, under traditional tort liability insurance, the
poor-carrying either no or low liability insurance--can similarly draw more from the pool
of liability insurance than they pay into it. (Though in fact, they may not do so. The poor
are often reluctant to invoke the tort process; in addition, the poor suffer no or less wage
loss and lower medical bills compared to those more affluent. See supra main text accom-
panying note 53.) The proposed plan preserves at least this theoretical advantage for the
poor. But it also advantages the more affluent (1) by guaranteeing that those who buy
Personal Injury Protection insurance will be covered up to whatever high limits they buy
irrespective of fault, and (2) by limiting their tort exposure (including to uninsureds) to
uncompensated economic loss payable periodically. This means that the temptation of
those claiming against Personal Injury Protection insureds to pad claims will not be nearly
so great as under tort liability. See supra note 7 to main text.
4. The last phrase in subsection 3a incorporates a common concept in insurance such
that a victim of an intentional act (which is not accidental as to the intentional actor) is
nonetheless accidental as to the victim of the actor's intentional act.
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of [$25,000] payable to the dependents, if any, or, if none, to the heirs
or estate of the decedent. Nothing contained in this section prevents
a Personal Injury Protection Insurer from also making available other
additional compensation benefits in coverages and amounts other
than those prescribed in this section. No applicant or insured may be
required to purchase a lesser amount than those prescribed in this
subsection.
c. "Basic Personal Injury Protection" means coverage, for Per-
sonal Injury Protection which provides benefits for loss resulting from
accidental bodily injury. Basic Personal Injury Protection benefits
consist of the following elements with an aggregate limit of [$15,000]
per person:
(1) Medical expenses, subject to a deductible of [$250] applica-
ble only to the named insured and to resident relatives of the named
insured;
(2) Loss of income from work, not to exceed [$200] per week;
(3) Replacement services loss, not to exceed [$100] per week;
and
(4) A death benefit of [$10,000], payable to the dependents, if
any or, if none, to the heirs or estate of the decedent, if the death of
an injured person is directly and proximately caused by an accidental
bodily injury and occurs within one year of the date of such injury.
d. "Cause of action for injury" means a claim for accidental bod-
ily injury for economic or noneconomic loss, or both, caused by the
negligent conduct or intentional misconduct of another person
(whether directly or vicariously), and includes a claim by any person
other than a person suffering accidental bodily injury based on such
injury, including, but not limited to, loss of consortium, companion-
ship, or any other derivative claim.
e. "Collateral sources" means all benefits one receives or is enti-
tled to receive as reimbursement of loss because of an injury from
sources other than Personal Injury Protection benefits. In such calcu-
lation, no subtraction is made for amounts one receives or is entitled
to receive:
(1) in discharge of familial obligations or support;
(2) by reason of another's death, except that there is subtracted
from loss in calculating net loss those amounts received from social
security or workers' compensation; or
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(3) as gratuities. In no event is any payment made by an em-
ployer to his employee or an employee's survivors to be regarded as a
gratuity.5
f. "Commissioner" means the Commissioner of Insurance.6
g. "Coverage" means a policy or plan for insurance benefits.
h. "Dependent" means all persons related to another person by
blood, marriage, adoption or otherwise who reside in the same house-
hold as such person at the time of the accidental bodily injury, and
receive financial or services support from him or her.
i. "Driving under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs" refers
to such conduct when it causes or substantially contributes to the
harm claimed for. A driver is deemed to be driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol for the purposes of this Act only if a test of blood,
breath or urine as called for under the laws of this State shows an
illegal blood or breath alcohol content as defined by State law,7 or if a
driver refuses to undergo such tests as called for under the laws of this
State.8
j. "Economic loss" means medical expenses, loss of income from
work, and replacement services loss incurred by or on behalf of an
injured person as the result of an accidental bodily injury to such in-
jured person.9
k. "Fault" is encompassed by the definition of "Tort liability."
1. "Injured person" means a person who sustains accidental bod-
ily injury when eligible for benefits under a policy providing Personal
Injury Protection or under the assigned claims plan under section 23.
The term also includes where appropriate the personal representative
of an estate.
m. "Intentional misconduct" means conduct whereby harm is in-
tentionally caused or attempted to be caused by one who acts or fails
to act for the purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm is
5. Under subsection 3e, as to payment of both Personal Injury Protection benefits and
uncompensated economic loss, they are payable as excess (not primary) to other coverages
such as the victim's own health and disability insurance. To define these terms, primary
insurance covers from the first dollar (often after a deductible) as distinguished from ex-
cess coverage which pays only after primary coverage has been exhausted.
Subsection 3e is adapted from ROBERT KEETON & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTEG-
TION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICrim § 1.10, at 306 (1965).
6. O'Connell, supra note 1 to Appendix B, at 959 & n.39.
7. Id. at 959 & n.40.
8. Id. at nn. 41, 42.
9. The term "economic loss" (definition j) means pecuniary loss and monetary ex-
penses incurred by or on behalf of an injured person. The categories of economic loss are
medical expenses (definition o), replacement services loss (definition z), and loss of in-
come from work (definition n).
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substantially certain to follow when such conduct caused or substan-
tially contributed to the harm claimed for. A person does not inten-
tionally cause or attempt to cause harm (i) merely because his act or
failure to act is intentional or done with the realization that it creates
a grave risk of causing harm or (ii) if the act or omission causing bod-
ily harm is for the purpose of averting bodily harm to oneself or an-
other person.' 0
n. "Loss of income from work" means [80%] of loss of income an
injured person would have earned through work during the period of
disability, reduced by any income from substitute work actually per-
formed by the injured person, or by any income the injured person
would have earned in available appropriate substitute work which
such person was capable of performing but unreasonably failed to un-
dertake." Loss of income from work does not include any loss after
the death of an injured person and payment for the period of disabil-
ity is not to exceed two years from the date of the accident.
o. "Medical expenses" means reasonable expenses incurred by
an injured person for necessary medical, surgical, X-ray, dental, ambu-
lance, hospital, medical rehabilitation, and professional nursing serv-
ices and includes expenses for eyeglasses, hearing aids, and prosthetic
devices. The words "incurred by" include medical expenses incurred
on behalf of an injured person by a parent or guardian if the injured
person is a minor or incompetent, or by a surviving spouse if the in-
jured person be deceased. Personal Injury Protection Insurers are au-
thorized to review medical expenses prior to, during, and after the
course of treatment of an injured person, to assure that they are both
reasonable and necessary. Under Basic Personal Injury Protection
and under Added Personal Injury Protection, medical expenses are
payable for services provided to the injured person within two years of
the date of accidental bodily injury. "Medical expenses" does not
include:
10. O'Connell, supra note 1 to Appendix B, at 960 & n.46.
11. In subsection 3n,
the definition contains an explicit reference to the doctrine of avoidable conse-
quences-work loss is computed by subtracting not only income from work which
the injured person undertook in lieu of that which his injury prevented him from
performing but also income which he might have earned in available appropriate
substitute work. As under the common law doctrine of avoidable consequences,
the issue is whether claimed work loss is justly attributable to the injury. Subtrac-
tion of potential income from alternate work which the injured person declines is
proper only where, under all the circumstances, the alternate work is "appropri-
ate" and the injured person's refusal to undertake the work is "unreasonable."
UNIF. MOTOR VEmicLE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS Acr § 1(a) (5) (ii) cmt., 14 U.L.A. 46 (1972)
[hereinafter UMVARA].
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(1) that portion of the charge for a room in any hospital, clinic,
convalescent or nursing home, extended care facility or any similar
facility in excess of the reasonable and customary charge for semi-pri-
vate accommodations unless medically required; or
(2) treatment, services, products or procedures that are experi-
mental in nature, for research or not primarily designed to serve a
medical purpose, or not commonly and customarily recognized
throughout the medical profession and within the United States as
appropriate for treatment of accidental bodily injury.
p. "Medical rehabilitation" means rehabilitation services reason-
ably necessary and designed to reduce the disability and dependence
of an injured person and to restore such person, to the extent reason-
ably possible, to his or her pre-accident level of physical functioning.
q. "Motor vehicle" means:
(1) a vehicle of a kind required to be registered under the laws of
this State relating to motor vehicles, or
(2) a vehicle with four or more load bearing wheels, including a
trailer,' 2 designed for operation upon a public roadway by other than
muscular power, except a vehicle used exclusively upon stationary
rails or tracks. "Public roadway" means a way open to the use of the
public for purposes of automobile travel.13
r. "Noneconomic loss" means any loss other than economic loss
and includes, but is not necessarily limited to, pain, suffering, incon-
venience, mental anguish, and all other noneconomic damage
whether otherwise recoverable under the law of this State or not.
Noneconomic loss does not include economic loss caused by pain and
suffering or by physical impairment. 4
s. "Occupying" means to be in or upon a motor vehicle or en-
gaged in the immediate act of entering into or alighting from the mo-
tor vehicle.
12. Under subsection 3q(2), those on a motorcycle are not insured under Personal
Injury Protection. The tremendous exposure of a motorcyclist to personal injury would
mean that switching to first-party coverage whereby the motorcyclist insured himself for his
injuries, whether based on fault or not, would cause an exponential rise in motorcyclists'
personal injury premiums. The solution adopted under this bill is simply to exempt motor-
cyclists from the choice system, such that motorcyclists can sue and be sued in tort after
collision with those insured for Personal Injury Protection benefits as well as with those
insured under Tort Liability Insurance.
13. Under subsection 3q(2), the definition of a "public roadway" excludes trails open
to the public but designed solely for off-road vehicles. UMVARA, supra note 11 to Appen-
dix B, § 1(7) (ii), commentary at 273-74.
14. O'Connell, supra note 1 to Appendix B, at 962 & n.52.
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t. "Operation or use" means operation or use of a motor vehicle
as a motor vehicle. Operation or use does not include manufacturing,
sale or maintenance of a motor vehicle, including repairing, servicing,
washing, loading or unloading, unless the conduct occurs while occu-
pying it.15
u. "Owner" means the person or persons in whose name the mo-
tor vehicle has been registered. If no registration is in effect at the
time of an accident involving the motor vehicle, "owner" means the
person or persons holding legal title thereto, or in the event the mo-
tor vehicle is the subject of a security agreement or lease with option
to purchase with the debtor or lessee having the right of possession,
"owner" means the debtor or lessee. Owner does not include the
United States of America or any agency thereof except with respect to
motor vehicles for which it has elected to provide insurance.
v. "Person" includes an organization, public or private.
w. "Personal Injury Protection" means coverage providing Basic
(and, if purchased, Added) benefits, regardless of fault, for loss result-
ing from accidental bodily injury.
x. "Personal Injury Protection Insured" means, the first person
identified by name as an insured under a policy providing Personal
Injury Protection benefits, the spouse of such person if a resident of
household, and any other resident relative of the same household,
and, with respect to accidents within this State, any person who sus-
tains accidental bodily injury while occupying or through being struck
15. As to subsection 3t,
While "use" has a broader meaning than operating or driving a vehicle, the re-
quirement that use of the motor vehicle be "as a motor vehicle" qualifies the term
so that both the tort exemption and the availability of... benefits [without refer-
ence to fault] are more nearly limited to activities whose costs should be allocated
to motoring as part of an automobile insurance package. For example, it has no
application to an injury which occurs when a person slips and falls inside a travel
trailer which has been parked at a camp site.
UMVARA, supra note 11 to Appendix B, § 1(a)(6) cmt., 14 U.L.A. 47.
Also in subsection 3t,
The indefiniteness of the defined term ["as a vehicle"] has produced litigation in
cases arising under automobile liability policies. In some cases, in part because of
a tendency to construe an ambiguous term against the interests of the companies
drafting the policy, and, in part to assure a solvent source of payment to a person
injured by an admitted wrongdoer, it is arguable that courts have included acci-
dents too far removed from the general activity of motoring and that a narrower
construction of the term would be more consistent with the policy of this Act.
Other than specifying that injury arise out of maintenance or use "as a vehicle," it
has not been possible to define the general concept more specifically, so border-
line cases are left to the courts, as they have been under current automobile in-
surance policies.
IM. § l(a)(6) cmt., 14 U.LA 47.
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by a motor vehicle insured for Personal Injury Protection, unless such
person is insured pursuant to the Tort Liability Insurance option pro-
vided under section 4 or is an uninsured motorist.' 6
y. "Personal Injury Protection Insurer" means an insurer or quali-
fied self-insurer providing Personal Injury Protection benefits.
z. "Replacement services loss" means expenses reasonably in-
curred in obtaining ordinary and necessary services from others, not
members of the injured person's household, in lieu of the services the
injured person would have performed for the benefit of the house-
hold. Replacement services loss are not due if the injured person is
entitled to receive Personal Injury Protection benefits for loss of in-
come from work for the same time period. Replacement services loss
does not include any loss after the death of an injured person, and
payment for the period of disability under Basic Personal Injury Pro-
tection is not to exceed two years from the date of accidental bodily
injury.
aa. "Resident relative" means a person related to the owner of a
motor vehicle by blood, marriage, adoption, or otherwise, and resid-
ing in the same household. A person resides in the same household if
he or she usually makes his or her home in the same family unit, even
though temporarily living elsewhere.
bb. "Tort liability" means the legal obligation for payment of
damages caused by one adjudged to have committed a tort.
cc. "Tort Maintenance Coverage" means coverage under which a
person who has chosen Tort Liability Insurance coverage when in-
volved in an accident with a Personal Injury Protection insured, claims
for tort liability against his/her own insurer to the extent of such
coverage.
dd. "Uncompensated economic loss" means that portion of eco-
nomic loss arising out of an accidental bodily injury of an injured per-
son which exceeds the benefits provided by (i) Personal Injury
Protection coverage (except for loss on account of the application of a
deductible under such a policy), or (ii) Tort Maintenance Coverage,
and (iii) collateral sources. Such loss is recoverable under the same
terms and limitations as under Added Personal Injury Protection, but
16. The term "Personal Injury Protection Insured" (definition x) describes the people
who are "insureds" under a Personal Injury Protection policy, which allows them benefits
payable without regard to fault in case of a motor vehicle accident. The term means a
person identified by name as an insured in a Personal Injury Protection policy and his or
her spouse who lives in the same household. The term also includes any other relative of a
named insured who usually lives in the same household.
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shall not be subject to the aggregate limit of liability of such
coverage. 
17
ee. "Uninsured motorist" means the owner, or a dependent
thereof, of a motor vehicle uninsured for either Basic Personal Injury
Protection or Tort Liability Insurance at the limits prescribed by this
State's financial responsibility law, or higher while such person is op-
erating, using or occupying the owned but uninsured motor vehicle.
SECTION 4. INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS.1 8 Every motor vehicle re-
quired to be registered in this State can be insured:
17. As to subsection 3dd, for the circumstances under which a claim for uncompen-
sated economic loss is recovered, see supra main text accompanying note 11. Added Per-
sonal Injury Protection can be purchased to provide payment for economic loss in excess
of Basic Personal Injury Protection. Basic Personal Injury Protection limits are designed to
equal the amounts required under the enacting state's financial responsibility law for per-
sonal injury liability. These levels are generally in the range of $10-20,000. For a listing of
each state's financial responsibility requirement, see DOT REPORT, supra note 2 to Appen-
dix B, at 51-64. Although compensation for uncompensated economic loss is payable with-
out any limit, as a practical matter rarely will amounts be collectible beyond liability
insurance carried by the motorist against whom a claim is made.
18. This section, which is called "Insurance Requirements," is the core of the bill. The
first sentence is key. The section also provides that the purchase of Basic Personal Injury
Protection "meets the requirement's of this state's mandatory motor vehicle insurance
law." The section requires each insurance company to make available Added Personal
Injury Protection coverage and additional coverages if it sells Basic Personal Injury Protec-
tion insurance in the state.
A bill closely modeled on Appendix B was introduced in Hawaii in January 1995, as
H.B. 2286. A further wrinkle in the Hawaii version added by the author of Appendix B
would allow motorists a third option of going uninsured for either PIP or tort liability
coverage. H.B. 2286 read in part as follows:
§ 431-2. Insurance Requirements. (a) Every motor vehicle required to be regis-
tered in this State [may] be insured:
(1) For basic personal injury protection and the property damage liability
mandated under motor vehicle financial responsibility laws; or
(2) For bodily injury and property damage liability as described in the motor
vehicle financial responsibility laws; or
(3) For none of the above.
The point of including this provision was to recognize that even with the drastic reduc-
tion in the cost of auto insurance achieved by this proposed "choice" reform, many among
the poor will still be unable to afford it. Rather than continuing to force large numbers of
people into an illegal status, it seems feasible to allow them to go legally uninsured, 'pay-
ing' for that status by voluntarily waiving (by virtue of going uninsured) that portion of
their tort claims for pain and suffering. (This feature could also be enacted in states with-
out no-fault insurance or no-fault without a choice feature.) For more on this uninsured
motorist feature, see O'Connell's forthcoming article Granting Uninsured Motorists a Legal
Status by Waiver of Their Tort Claims for Economic Loss (Mar. 10, 1995) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author). Admittedly such a provision will be controversial. Indeed, it
will in all likelihood be dropped from H.B. 2286 in Hawaii. William Kresnak, Insurance Bill
Due a Rewrite in House: Rep. Menor [Chairman of the House Consumer Protection Committee]
Doesn't Like the No-Coverage Option, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Feb. 19, 1995, at A3.
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a. for Basic Personal Injury Protection and the property damage
liability mandated under this State's financial responsibility law, or
b. for bodily injury and property damage liability as described in
this State's financial responsibility law.
c. An insurance policy written by a Personal Injury Protection
Insurer pursuant to this Act to provide Basic Personal Injury Protec-
tion is deemed to include all Basic Personal Injury Protection cover-
age required by this Act. Coverage under Basic Personal Injury
Protection meets the requirements of this State's financial responsibil-
ity law even though such policy does not provide protection against
bodily injury liability claims arising out of accidents within this State. 19
d. A Personal Injury Protection Insurer shall make available, at
the option of a named insured, Added Personal Injury Protection on a
policy providing Basic Personal Injury Protection. The exercise of the
option not to purchase Added Personal Injury Protection by a named
insured or an applicant shall be binding on all Personal Injury Protec-
tion insureds covered under the policy.
e. A Personal Injury Protection insurer is authorized to write Per-
sonal Injury Protection without any deductible or subject to reason-
able deductibles pursuant to section 28 of this Act.
f. A Personal Injury Protection Insurer shall also make available a
pain and suffering coverage, pursuant to regulations issued under sec-
tion 28 of this Act, with a limit of [$50,000], payable if the injured
person sustains an accidental bodily injury resulting in death or dis-
memberment or significant and permanent loss of important bodily
function or significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement.
Nothing contained herein shall preclude any insurer from offering
higher limits of pain and suffering coverage or providing broader
coverage.
g. In addition to Added Personal Injury Protection coverages, a
Personal Injury Protection insurer shall make available other insur-
ance coverages with the approval of the Commissioner. Such cover-
ages shall include, but are not limited to, bodily injury liability
insurance, collision coverage, and comprehensive physical damage
coverage.
h. An insurance policy written by a motor vehicle liability insurer
pursuant to this Act to provide coverage under the Tort Liability In-
19. As to subsection 4c, a Personal Injury Protection Insured is not required to carry
bodily injury liability insurance. People owning their own homes or other substantial assets
will want to buy residual liability insurance, but as the main text indicates it will be quite
inexpensive.
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surance option shall include Tort Maintenance Coverage for acciden-
tal bodily injury of an insured under the Tort Liability Insurance
option, caused by the negligence, in whole or in part, of a Personal
Injury Protection insured. Such insurance will pay such damages as
might have been recovered against a Personal Injury Protection in-
sured but for the exemption from tort liability provided by section 14
up to the liability limits of the Tort Maintenance Coverage.
SECTION 5. REQUIRED LIMITS OF LIABILITY COVERAGE.Every
owner who chooses the Tort Liability Insurance Option must carry
liability insurance in an amount equal to the minimum liability limits
for accidental bodily injury and property damage as specified by this
State's financial responsibility law. Insurers providing coverage for
such persons shall include Tort Maintenance Coverage required in
section 4 in all policies providing primary coverage for legal liability
for motor vehicles at limits equal to the bodily injury liability coverage
carried by the Tort Maintenance Coverage insured.
SECTION 6. ELECTION OF PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION OPTION
OR TORT MAINTENANCE COVERAGE OPTION. 2 0 Upon the earliest and
first renewal of any applicable motor vehicle liability insurance policy
on or after the effective date of this Act, or before the issuance of a
policy required by this Act, a choice must be made of either the Tort
Maintenance Coverage option or the Personal Injury Protection op-
tion. In order to minimize conflict between the two options, all motor
vehicle insurers are authorized to maintain underwriting rules which
encourage uniformity within a household. A choice made pursuant to
this Act is binding with respect to any continuation, renewal, or rein-
statement of an applicable motor vehicle insurance policy, and contin-
ues with respect to any policy which extends, supersedes, or replaces
the policy unless the named insured subsequently makes a different
choice in writing.
SECTION 7. APPLICATION OF COVERAGE.
a. If there is only one vehicle owned by the named insured or any
member of the household of the named insured, the choice made by
the named insured is applicable to his or her spouse and to any resi-
20. This section requires motorists to elect between the Personal Injury Protection sys-
tem and the tort system. It establishes procedures for such elections and for establishing
their effective date. It also provides that a motor vehicle insurer may encourage that all the
motor vehicle insurance policies within the same household be of the same type. Without
this provision an insurer might find it administratively burdensome to have different op-
tions made by individual family members.
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dent relatives of the household. That choice also applies to all per-
sons insured under the policy while occupying other motor vehicles or
if struck by another motor vehicle.
b. If there is more than one motor vehicle in the household, and
the named insured chooses different options for different vehicles,
the choice applicable to the vehicle in use governs not only the
named insured, but also all other persons insured under the policy
whose injury arises out of the use of that motor vehicle unless the
named insured has specifically identified family members who shall be
Personal Injury Protection insureds. If the named insured is injured
while occupying or through being struck by another motor vehicle,
the Tort Maintenance Coverage option shall be deemed applicable
and Personal Injury Protection benefits shall not be provided. If any
other person insured under two or more policies covering different
options is injured while occupying or through being struck by another
motor vehicle, and that insured has not been specifically identified by
the named insured as being a Personal Injury Protection insured at all
times, the Tort Maintenance Coverage option shall be deemed appli-
cable and personal benefits shall not be provided.
c. If there are two or more vehicles in the household, each
owned by different persons, each such person shall have the right to
choose either the Personal Injury Protection option or the Tort Main-
tenance Option coverage for himself or herself. That person's choice
shall determine that person's rights no matter which vehicle he or she
is occupying or which vehicle he or she might be struck by. The rights
of all members of the household who are not motor vehicle owners
shall be governed by the choice applicable to the motor vehicle which
they were occupying at the time of the injury, if that vehicle was
owned by a member of the household.
d. In the event of a bodily injury occurring prior to the effective
date of a required choice, if there are conflicting choices within the
household creating questions as to the applicability of the Personal
Injury Protection option or the Tort Maintenance Coverage option,
or if there is a failure to make a choice as required by this Act, Tort
Maintenance insurance will be applicable, and Personal Injury Protec-
tion benefits will not be payable.
SECTION 8. GEOGRAPHIC APPLICATION OF PERSONAL INJURY PRO-
TECTION POLICIES."1 A Personal Injury Protection Insurer shall pay
21. This section provides that Personal Injury Protection benefits shall be paid to a
Personal Injury Protection Insured injured anywhere in the United States and Canada. A
Personal Injury Protection policy must contain provisions that satisfy the financial responsi-
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Personal Injury Protection benefits for accidental bodily injury of a
Personal Injury Protection Insured sustained within the United States
of America, its territories or possessions, or Canada. Any Personal In-
jury Protection insurance policy issued to satisfy the financial responsi-
bility law of this State shall be conformed to satisfy the financial
responsibility law of any jurisdiction mentioned above in which the
insured motor vehicle is being operated with respect to an accident
occurring in that jurisdiction.
SECTION 9. PERSONS NOT ENTITLED TO PERSONAL INJURY PROTEC-
TION BENEFITS. 2 2 A Personal Injury Protection Insurer has no obliga-
tion to provide Personal Injury Protection benefits to or on behalf of
any injured person who:
a. was involved in a motor vehicle accident while committing a
felony or while voluntarily occupying a motor vehicle known by him
or her to be stolen;
b. was driving under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs;
c. is injured while occupying a motor vehicle owned by, or fur-
nished or available for the regular use of the injured person, or the
injured person's resident spouse or relative, if such motor vehicle is
not described in the policy under which a claim is made, or is not a
newly acquired or replacement motor vehicle covered under the
terms of the policy;
d. was operating or occupying a motor vehicle with three or
fewer load bearing wheels;
e. was guilty of intentional misconduct.2" (If a person dies as a
result of intentional misconduct aimed at himself or herself, his or her
survivors are not entitled to Personal Injury Protection for loss arising
from the decedent's injury or death.);
bility law of any state or Canadian province in which the insured motor vehicle can be
expected to be operated.
Financial responsibility laws, referred to in section 8, require motorists (or place pen-
alties on them for failing) to carry minimum limits of automobile insurance.
22. This section provides that no Personal Injury Protection benefits will be paid to
individuals who fall into one or more of the following categories:
* persons driving under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs;
* persons occupying an uninsured motor vehicle which they themselves do not own;
* persons operating or occupying a motorcycle;
* persons occupying a motor vehicle known to be stolen or in the course of commit-
ting a felony; and
* persons guilty of intentional misconduct (i.e. a person who intended to commit
homicide, assault, or suicide by automobile).
23. See supra text accompanying note 10 to Appendix B.
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f. is insured pursuant to the Tort Maintenance Coverage option
described in section 4h, or
g. is an uninsured motorist, or a dependent of an uninsured mo-
torist who is not otherwise insured for Personal Injury Protection.
Nothing contained herein prevents a Personal Injury Protection
Insurer from including in Personal Injury Protection coverage per-
sons mentioned in this section, but only if such is done by language
clearly manifesting an intent to provide such coverage.
SECTION 10. PAYMENT OF PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION BENE-
FITS. Personal Injury Protection benefits when due are payable at the
option of the Personal Injury Protection Insurer to any of the
following:
a. the injured person;
b. the parent or guardian of the injured person, if the injured
person is a minor or incompetent;
c. a dependent survivor, executor or administrator of the of the
injured person; or
d. any other person or organization rendering the services for
which payment is due.
SECTION 11. MULTIPLE COVERAGES. 4 Regardless of the number
of motor vehicles involved, persons covered, claims made, motor vehi-
cles or premiums shown on the policy or premiums paid, in no event
shall the coverage limits under a motor vehicle insurance policy for
any one coverage be added to, combined with, or otherwise stacked
upon any other coverage limit to determine the maximum limit of
coverage available to an injured person for any one accident. Unless
the contract clearly provides otherwise, policies or plans may also pro-
vide that if two or more policies, plans, or coverages apply equally to
the same accident, the highest limit of liability applicable shall be the
maximum amount available to an insured person under any one of
such policies. Each such policy, plan, or coverage shall bear its pro-
portionate share of the loss.
SECTION 12. PRIOmmTY OF BENEFITS. 2 5
a. Persons entitled to Basic Personal Injury Protection benefits
required or provided pursuant to this Act are entitled to at least the
24. O'Connell, supra note I to Appendix B, at 966 & n.69.
25. This section determines which Personal Injury Protection coverage will provide
compensation to a person qualified to receive such benefits. The underlying principle set
forth in subsection 12a is that a person suffering loss should make his claim for benefits
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Personal Injury Protection coverage under the policy insuring them
and shall claim such benefits from insurers in the following order of
priority up to the limits of Personal Injury Protection in the listed
category:
First: The Personal Injury Protection covering a motor vehicle
involved in the accident, if the person injured was an occupant of or
was struck by such motor vehicle at the time of the accident.
Second: The Personal Injury Protection under which the injured
person is or was an insured.
Third: If no Personal Injury Protection is available under the
above priorities, a person injured as a result of a motor vehicle acci-
dent may claim benefits under the Assigned Claims Plan pursuant to
section 23 of this Act, unless unqualified for benefits under section 6.
b. If two or more insurers are obligated to pay Personal Injury
Protection benefits in accordance with the priorities set out in this
section, the insurer against whom the claim is first made shall pay the
claim as if wholly responsible, and may thereafter recover contribu-
tion pro rata from any other insurer at the same priority level for the
cost of the payments and the processing of the claim. For purposes of
this section, an unoccupied parked motor vehicle is not a motor vehi-
cle involved in an accident unless it was parked in such a way as to
cause unreasonable risk of injury.
SECTION 13. COORDINATION OF BENEFITS.26 A Basic Personal In-
jury Protection Insurer has the primary obligation to indemnify an
against the insurer of the car which he was occupying or was struck by. In effect then, the
insurance follows the car, not the driver and his family. Concerning this distinction, see
DOT REPORT, supra note 2 to Appendix B, at 137-38; see also KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra
note 5 to Appendix B, at 370-79.
Under subsection 12b, if two or more insurers of the same priority level are obligated
to pay Personal Injury Protection benefits, the insurer against whom the claim is first made
shall pay benefits, and may thereafter recover a pro rata contribution from every other
insurer at the same priority level. The section also provides that an unoccupied parked
motor vehicle is not a motor vehicle involved in an accident, such that it would not become
the source of payment, even if damaged in the accident, "unless parked in such a way as to
cause unreasonable risk of injury."
26. See supra text accompanying note 5 to Appendix B. Section 13 concerns the effect
of collateral sources of benefits (such as health and disability coverages) on the right to
receive Personal Injury Protection benefits.
Section 13 provides in effect that benefits from collateral sources received by a person
injured in a motor vehicle accident shall be subtracted from Personal Injury Protection
benefits payable to that person.
As a corollary to Personal Injury Protection as excess insurance over all other collecti-
ble coverage, the Personal Injury Protection Insurer has no right of subrogation except as
provided in section 15.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
injured person except to the extent of collateral sources paid or paya-
ble to such person.
SECTION 14. TORT RIGHTS AND LEGAL LIABILITY UNDER THIS
ACT.2 7
a. No Personal Injury Protection Insured has a cause of action
for injury against, nor is liable to, any other person on account of an
accident occurring within this State, except as provided in subsections
b, c, d, and e and except for injury caused other than by the owner-
ship, operation, or use of a motor vehicle.
b. An injured person has a cause of action for accidental bodily
injury against any party driving under the influence of alcohol or ille-
gal drugs or guilty of intentional misconduct. Any party providing
Personal Injury Protection or Tort Maintenance Coverage benefits to
such injured person has a right of subrogation under this subsection
b.
27. This section defines the extent to which an insured who is injured in a motor vehi-
cle accident is prohibited from bringing a lawsuit in tort.
Subsection 14a provides that no insured has a cause of action for injury against any
other person except as provided in the next four subsections of this section.
Under the last clause of subsection 14a, a railroad covering the motor vehicles it owns
under Personal Injury Protection remains liable for accidents in which its train negligently
collides with a motor vehicle.
As to subsection 14e, because payment is made only for a claimant's economic losses,
unless a claimant's attorney's fee were paid in addition to his damages, he would have to
pay attorney's fees, if any, be out-of-pocket. See supra note 15 to main text.
As to subsection 14e, for a definition of collision insurance, see supra note 28 to main
text. This provision too (along with those described in the main text at notes 45-52) en-
ables special cost savings for the poor-a group especially hard hit by the high costs of
compulsory auto insurance. Although states require only low limits of tort liability for per-
sonal injury-say, $15,000 or $20,000-around 15-20% of motorists either will not or can-
not pay the premium, and thereby remain uninsured. The percentage of uninsured
motorists can vastly exceed 50% in the inner cities of many major metropolitan areas. See
Vlae Kershner, Some See No End to Battle over No-Fault S.F. CHRON., Oct, 4, 1989, at A9;
Kenneth Reich, Relief From High Auto Insurance Not in Sight: Although State Drivers are Fuming
Powerfid Lobbies Stymie Attempts at Legislative Reform, LA TIMES, Nov. 23, 1986, at 1.
Because the poor ordinarily drive older cars not covered by collision insurance (many
motorists are probably well advised not to insure a car for collision coverage if it is more
than, say, five years old), poorer motorists buying Personal Injury Protection insurance will
save substantially on property damage liability costs by virtue of their exemption from
property damage claims to the extent other Personal Injury Protection insureds they col-
lide with carry collision insurance. Such a provision can also bejustified in that once loss is
covered by efficient first party insurance payable without reference to fault-such as colli-
sion insurance-it no longer makes much economic sense to redistribute the loss under a
second insurance scheme, especially a cumbersome one necessitating establishing fault
with all its transaction costs. John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and loss Allocation in
Tort Law, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1478, 1536-37 (1966); see generally FlemingJames,Jr., Social Insur-
ance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative Remedies, 27 N.Y.U. L. REv. 537 (1952).
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c. A Personal Injury Protection Insured has a cause of action for
accidental bodily injury for uncompensated economic loss against,
and is liable for same, to, any person insured under Personal Injury
Protection or Tort Maintenance Coverage.
d. Benefits under subsection c include reasonable expenses in-
curred by the party in collecting such benefits, including a reasonable
attorney's fee for advising and representing a claimant for such bene-
fits. No part of the fee for representing such party in connection with
such benefits is a charge against benefits otherwise due the claimant,
and no additional fee .may be charged by an attorney to any party in
collecting such benefits. All or part of the fee may be deducted from
the benefits otherwise due the claimant if any significant part of the
claim for such benefits was fraudulent or so excessive as to have no
reasonable foundation. In any action brought against an injured per-
son by a Personal Injury Protection Insurer, the court may award the
injured person's attorney a reasonable attorney's fee for defending
the action if the injured person was the prevailing party. 8
e. A Personal Injury Protection Insured whose motor vehicle is
damaged by the fault of another Personal Injury Protection Insured
has a cause of action for damage to such motor vehicle only to the
extent such motor vehicle is not covered by collision insurance.'
f. A person covered by Tort Maintenance Coverage has a cause of
action for injury against another person so covered.
g. An uninsured motorist has no cause of action against a Per-
sonal Injury Protection Insured for (1) injury other than for uncom-
pensated economic loss and (2) damage to property except damage
in excess of the property damage liability limits mandated under this
State's financial responsibility law unless the Personal Injury Protec-
tion Insured was driving under the influence of alcohol or illegal
drugs or was guilty of intentional misconduct. An uninsured motorist
remains liable in tort to a person insured for Personal Injury Protec-
tion benefits for noneconomic loss, economic loss, and property
damage.3 °
SECTION 15. INSURER'S RIGHT OF SUBROGATION. 31 There is no
right of subrogation or contribution by a Personal Injury Protection
28. O'Connell, supra note 1 to Appendix B, at 970 & n.87.
29. Id. at 957 n.32.
30. Id. at 970 & n.89.
31. Under subsection 15a, to the extent that the Personal Injury Protection Insurer is
obligated to pay any Personal Injury Protection benefits, it has a right to be reimbursed for
those payments against an uninsured motorist. "This right to claim against the uninsured
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Insurer except under sections 14, 16, 23, and except that a Personal
Injury Protection Insurer is subrogated, to the extent of its obliga-
tions, to all of the rights of its Personal Injury Protection Insured with
respect to an accident caused in whole or in part by
a. the negligence of an uninsured motorist;
b. the negligence of the owner or operator of a motor vehicle
having a gross weight of 7000 pounds or more; 2
c. driving under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs;33
d. intentional misconduct; or
e. any person who is not affected by the limitations on tort rights
and liabilities pursuant to section 14.
SECTION 16. PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION BENEFITS AND CAUSES
OF ACTION FOR INJURY.3 4 No subtraction is made against Personal In-
jury Protection benefits due because of the value of a cause of action
for injury preserved under this Act, except that after recovery is real-
ized under such cause of action, a subtraction is made to the extent of
the net recovery, exclusive of reasonable attorneys' fees and other rea-
sonable expenses incurred in effecting the recovery. If Personal In-
jury Protection benefits have already been received, the recipient
thereof shall repay to the insurer paying Personal Injury Protection
benefits out of such recovery a sum equal to the Personal Injury Pro-
tection benefits received but not more than the realized net recovery,
and the insurer shall have a lien on the recovery to this extent. Any
remainder of the net recovery from such a cause of action applies
motorist, extant at common law, is unchanged by the bill. Such a right is very often only a
theoretical one, given the lack of assets held by most uninsured motorists." Id. at 956 n.28.
As to subsection 15b, given their greater weight, large trucks in truck-car collisions
disproportionately effect damage on private passenger vehicles and their occupants rather
than vice versa. Lacking the above provision there would be a windfall to owners of such
trucks and other large commercial vehicles following truck-car collisions because the in-
surer of each vehicle would simply pay the occupants of its own vehicle. Thus as a simple
solution to this problem, the bill allows subrogation, based on fault, by private passenger
car Personal Injury Protection payers against trucks and other vehicles having a weight of
7000 pounds or more.
Under subsection 15c, every motorist remains liable for driving under the influence of
alcohol or illegal drugs (as well as for intentional misconduct under d).
Under subsection 15e, persons who retain tort rights and liabilities include an out-of-
state motorist.
32. Id. at 968 n.74.
33. Id. at 968 n.75.
34. This section coordinates common law claims based on fault and claims for personal
injury protection benefits. For its origins, see KEETON & O'CoNNELL, supra note 5 to Ap-
pendix B, § 1.10(c) (2), at 307, 402-04.
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periodically against loss as it accrues, until an amount equal to the net
recovery under such a cause of action has been subtracted.
SECTION 17. PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION BENEFITS PAYABLE
PERIODICALLY.1
5
a. Personal Injury Protection benefits are payable monthly as loss
accrues. Such benefits are overdue if not paid within 30 days after the
Personal Injury Protection insurer receives reasonable proof of the
fact and the amount of loss sustained, except that a Personal Injury
Protection Insurer may accumulate claims for periods not exceeding
one month, and benefits are not overdue if paid within 20 days after
the period of accumulation. If reasonable proof is not supplied as to
the entire claim, the amount supported by reasonable proof is over-
due if not paid within 30 days after such proof is received by the in-
surer, subject to the right of review specified in section 30. Any part
or all of the remainder of the claim that is later supported by reason-
able proof is overdue if not paid within 30 days after such proof is
received by the insurer. For the purpose of calculating the extent to
which any benefits are overdue, payment is treated as made on the
date a draft or other valid instrument is placed in the United States
mail in a properly addressed postpaid envelope, or, if not so posted,
on the date of delivery. Personal Injury Protection benefits may be
paid by the Personal Injury Protection insurer directly to persons sup-
plying necessary products, services, or accommodations to the injured
person. If overdue benefits are recovered against a Personal Injury
Protection Insurer or are paid by a Personal Injury Protection Insurer,
the provisions of subsection 14e pertaining to expenses and an attor-
ney's fee apply. In addition, the insurer is obligated to pay interest on
the overdue payment at [1501% of the prime rate in effect at the time
the payment became overdue.
35. This section provides that Personal Injury Protection benefits are payable monthly,
as the losses accrue. If they are not paid to the victim or the provider of service within 30
days after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of loss sustained,
the benefits are overdue. (Alternatively, benefits are overdue if they are accumulated for
up to one month if they are not paid within 20 days after the period of accumulation.)
The section further provides that "all overdue payments bear interest at the rate of
150% of the prime rate in effect at the time the payments became overdue." If overdue
benefits are recovered from an insurer or paid by an insurer, the insurer shall also pay
reasonable attorney's fees.
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SECTION 18. ASSIGNMENT OR GARNISHMENT OF PERSONAL INJURY
PROTECTION BENEFITS.3 6
a. Personal Injury Protection benefits, other than those for medi-
cal expenses, are exempt from garnishment, attachment, execution,
and any other process or claim to the extent that wages or earnings
are exempt under any applicable law exempting wages or earnings
from process or claims.
b. An agreement for assignment of any right to Personal Injury
Protection benefits payable in the future other than medical expenses
is unenforceable except to the extent that such benefits are for the
cost of products, services, or accommodations provided or to be pro-
vided by the assignee or that benefits for loss of income from work or
replacement services are assigned to secure payment of alimony,
maintenance, or child support. Pain and suffering coverage benefits
may also be assigned.
SECTION 19. No PENALTY FOR CLAIMS FOR PERSONAL INJURY PRO-
TECTION BENEFITS. 3 7 An Insurer shall not cancel, fail to renew, or in-
crease the premium of its Insured solely on account of the Insured or
any other injured person making a claim for Personal Injury Protec-
tion benefits or for collision damage to the insured vehicle. Violation
of this section is punishable by a fine of [$1000] per offense, such
punishment to be exclusive of all other remedies permitted by law.
SECTION 20. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.3 8 Subject to the arbitra-
tion provisions which follow, if no Personal Injury Protection benefits
have been paid, an action therefore may be commenced against the
Personal Injury Protection Insurer not later than two years after the
injured person suffers accidental bodily injury. If Personal Injury Pro-
tection benefits have been paid, an action for recovery of further ben-
efits by either the injured person or another claimant may be
commenced not later than two years after the last payment of benefits.
36. O'Connell, supra note 1 to Appendix B, at 973-74 & n.101.
37. This section provides that an insurer may not cancel or fail to renew a policy nor
may it increase the premium of an insured, solely because he or she filed a claim for
Personal Injury Protection benefits or for collision damage to the insured vehicle.
38. This section provides a two year statute of limitations for claims for Personal Injury
Protection benefits. Such an action must be brought against a Personal Injury Protection
Insurer within two years after the accident or not later than two years after the last payment
of benefits.
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SECTION 21. MENTAL AND PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS. 3 9
a. Whenever the mental or physical condition of an injured per-
son is material to any claim thai has been made or may be made for
past or future Personal Injury Protection benefits, the insured person
shall submit to reasonable mental or physical examinations by a physi-
cian or physicians designated by the insurer at a reasonably conve-
nient time and location, subject to regulations, if any, promulgated by
the Commissioner. Personal Injury Protection Insurers are author-
ized to include provisions of this nature in policies providing Personal
Injury Protection benefits.
b. Where an insurer has requested of a person receiving Personal
Injury Protection benefits that such person undergo medical or reha-
bilitation services, and such person unreasonably refuses to comply
with such request, the insurer may, upon written notice, suspend all
future such benefits until such person complies with that request.
SECTION 22. VERIFICATION OF ENTITLEMENT TO BENEFITS."
a. Every employer shall furnish pertinent information on a form
approved by the Commissioner regarding an employee who has filed
a claim for Personal Injury Protection benefits if a request is made by
an insurer providing such benefits under this section.
b. Every physician, hospital, clinic, or other medical institution
providing, before or after an injury resulting from a motor vehicle
accident upon which a claim for Personal Injury Protection benefits is
based, any products, services, or accommodations in relation to that
or any other injury, or in relation to a condition claimed to be con-
nected with that or any other injury shall, if requested to do so by the
Personal Injury Protection Insurer against whom the claim has been
made, furnish a written report of the history, condition, and treat-
ment, and the dates and costs of such treatment, of the injured per-
son. Such information shall be provided together with a sworn
statement that the treatment or services rendered were reasonable
and necessary with respect to the injury sustained and identifying
which portion of the expenses for such treatment or services were in-
curred as a result of such injury. Every such physician, hospital, clinic,
or other medical institution shall also promptly produce and permit
the inspection and copying of its records regarding such history, con-
dition, and treatment, and the dates and costs of treatment. The
sworn statement required under this section reads as follows:
39. O'Connell, supra note 1 to Appendix B, at 974-75 & n.104.
40. Id. at 975 & n.105.
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"Under penalty of perjury I declare that I have read the foregoing
and the facts alleged are true, to the best of my knowledge and belief."
No cause of action for violation of a physician-patient privilege or
invasion of the right of privacy is allowed against any physician, hospi-
tal, clinic, or other medical institution complying with the provisions
of this section. The person requesting records and a sworn statement
under this subsection shall pay all reasonable costs connected
therewith.
c. In the event of any dispute regarding the Personal Injury Pro-
tection Insurer's right to discovery of facts about an injured person, if
the dispute is not referred to arbitration under section 31, a court of
record may enter an order for such discovery as justice requires.
SECTION 23. ASSIGNED CLAIMS PLAN. 4 1 Insurers and qualified
self-insurers authorized to provide Personal Injury Protection insur-
ance under this Act shall organize, participate in, and maintain an
assigned claims plan to provide Basic Personal Injury Protection bene-
fits to any person who is injured as a result of a motor vehicle accident
if:
a. Basic Personal Injury Protection benefits are payable but not
applicable to the injury for some reason other than those specified in
section 9 of this Act; provided such person shall have the right to re-
ject Personal Injury Protection benefits and to seek damages in tort.
The election must be made within ninety days after the accident or
ninety days after receiving written notice of the right of election.
b. Basic Personal Injury Protection benefits are unavailable, in
whole or in part, because of financial inability of an insurer to fulfill
its obligations. Payments made by the Assigned Claims Plan pursuant
to this subsection b constitute covered claims of the Insurance Guar-
anty Association under the laws of this State.
c. The Assigned Claims Plan shall provide such rules and agree-
ments for the operation of the Plan and for the equitable distribution
of costs as approved by the Commissioner. Any claim brought
through the Assigned Claims Plan is assigned to an insurer in accord-
ance with such rules and agreements, and that insurer, after such as-
signment, has the rights and obligations it would have had if, prior to
such assignment, it had issued a policy providing Personal Injury Pro-
tection applicable to the loss. Any person accepting Personal Injury
Protection benefits under the Assigned Claims Plan has such rights
41. Id. at 975-76 & n.106.
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and obligations as he or she would have had under a policy issued to
him or her providing Personal Injury Protection benefits.
d. If a claim qualifies for assignment under this section, the As-
signed Claims Plan and any insurer to whom the claim is assigned is
subrogated to all of the rights of the claimant against any person liable
for such loss and against any insurer, its successor in interest, or any
other person or organization legally obligated to provide Personal In-
jury Protection benefits to the insured person for benefits provided by
the assignment.
SECTION 24. FRAUDULENT CLAIMS. 42 Any person, including an
insurer, who, with intent to defraud, or deceive any other person in
connection with a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an
insurance policy providing benefits under this Act, does or attempts to
do either of the following, knowing that such statement contains any
false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or
thing material to such claim
a. presents or causes to be presented, or conspires to present or
cause to be presented, any written or oral statements in connection
with a claim for payment or other benefit; or
b. prepares or makes any written or oral statement that is in-
tended to be presented to any person in connection with or in sup-
port of any claim for payment or other benefit, shall be guilty of a
felony punishable by a fine of not more than [$10,000].
SECTION 25. NON-DISCRIMINATION IN FEES FOR MEDICAL SERV-
ICES.4 A physician, hospital, clinic, or other person or institution law-
fully rendering treatment to an injured person, and a person or
institution providing medical rehabilitation services following an in-
jury to an injured person, may charge only a reasonable amount for
the products, services, and accommodations rendered. The charge
shall not exceed the amount the person or institution customarily
charges for like products, services, and accommodations in cases not
involving insurance.
SECTION 26. MANAGED CARE." A Personal Injury Protection In-
surer, with the approval of the Commissioner, may utilize, for the pay-
ment of medical expenses provided under Personal Injury Protection,
managed care systems, including but not limited to, health mainte-
42. Id. at 976 & n.107.
43. Id. at 977 & n.108.
44. Id. at 977 & n.109.
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nance 45 and preferred provider organizations,' and may require an
injured person to obtain health care through a managed care system
designated by the Personal Injury Protection Insurer if such injured
person has opted to be subject to such a managed care system at the
time of purchase of Personal Injury Protection coverage at an appro-
priately reduced premium.
SECTION 27. SAFETY EQUIPMENT. 4 7 Each Personal Injury Protec-
tion Insurer shall adopt an actuarially sound program which provides
incentives, in the form of increased benefits, reduced premiums, or
other means, for Personal Injury Protection Insureds to install, main-
tain, and make use of injury reducing devices such as, but not neces-
sarily limited to, seat and harness belts, air bags, and child restraint
systems. 4
8
SECTION 28. REGULATIONS.4 9
a. The Commissioner may adopt additional regulations to pro-
vide effective administration of this Act that are consistent with its pur-
poses and are fair and equitable, including regulations which
authorize Personal Injury Protection Insurers to write Personal Injury
Protection insurance with reasonable deductibles higher or lower in
amount than that provided in section 3c, and regulations to permit
the offering of pain and suffering coverage.
b. The Commissioner shall develop an informational brochure
which must be provided by each insurer or agent to each policyholder
or applicant for motor vehicle insurance explaining the Personal In-
jury Protection option and the Tort Liability Insurance option as well
as the consequence of selection of one option over the other.
The Commissioner shall establish, within the Department of In-
surance, a compliance unit which shall monitor all complaints against
insurers, health care providers, and attorneys arising out of the provi-
sion of Personal Injury Protection benefits. The Commissioner shall
report to the legislature, at least annually, on the nature of the com-
plaints, the penalties levied against insurers, and the final disposition
of complaints. The report, which will identify parties by name, will be
a public record available on request by any member of the public.
45. Id. at 977 & n.110.
46. Id. at 977 & n.l11.
47. Id. at 977 & n.113.
48. I& at 977 & n. 114; see also supra main text accompanying note 56.
49. O'Connell, supra note 1 to Appendix B, at 978 & n.115.
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SECTION 29. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR ADVISING ON OP-
TIONS. 5 0 No insurer or any agent or employee of such insurer, no
insurance producer representing a motor vehicle insurer or any auto-
mobile residual market plan, and no attorney licensed to practice law
within this State shall be liable in an action for damages on account of
an election of the Tort Liability Insurance option, an election of the
Personal Injury Protection option, or a failure to make a required
election, unless such person has wilfully misrepresented the available
choices or has fraudulendy induced the election of one system over
the other.
SECTION 30. COST OF LIVING ADJUSTMENT. 5 1 Every two years, on
the anniversary of the effective date of this Act, the Commissioner
shall report in writing to the legislature on the effect of changes in the
relevant components of the cost of living on levels of benefits, limits of
liability, and deductibles mentioned in this Act.
SECTION 31. ARBITRATION. 5" Any dispute with respect to Per-
sonal Injury Protection coverage between a Personal Injury Protection
Insurer and an injured person, or the dependents of such person,
shall be submitted to arbitration. Such dispute either shall be submit-
ted to the American Arbitration Association, or be submitted for de-
termination in the following manner: Upon the request for
arbitration being made by either party, each party to the dispute shall
select an arbitrator and the two arbitrators so named shall select a
third arbitrator. The written decision of any two arbitrators is binding
on each party. If arbitrators are not selected within 45 days from such
request, either party may require that such arbitration be submitted to
the American Arbitration Association.
SECTION 32. OUT-OF-STATE VEHICLES. 5" Each insurer authorized
to transact or transacting business in this State shall file with the Com-
missioner, as a condition of its continued transaction of business
within this State, a form approved by the Commissioner declaring that
any contract of motor vehicle liability insurance, wherever issued, cov-
ering the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle while the motor vehi-
cle is in this State, is deemed to provide the insurance required by
section 5 of this Act unless the named insured, prior to a motor vehi-
cle accident within this State, has elected the Personal Injury Protec-
50. See id. at 972 & n.96.
51. Id. at 978 & n.116.
52. Id. at 978 & n.117.
53. Id. at 978-79 & n.118.
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tion option pursuant to section 4. Any nonadmitted insurer may also
file such form. In the event a person is entitled to Personal Injury
Protection benefits or their equivalent under the requirements of
more than one state, such person shall elect to recover under the laws
of any one such state and such election shall represent the exclusive
source of recovery of all Personal Injury Protection benefits, or their
equivalent, paid or payable under the financial responsibility require-
ments of that or any other state.
SECTION 33. TERMS, CONDITIONS, AND EXCLUSIONS.5 4 All insur-
ance coverages provided pursuant to this Act are subject to such
terms, conditions, and exclusions as have been approved by the
Commissioner.
SECTION 34. APPLICABLE PROVISIONS TO TORT MAINTENANCE
COVERAGE. As to matters covered in, sections 12, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 23,
26, 27, 29, 32, and other related matters, where appropriate laws and
regulations of this State applicable to uninsured motorist coverage are
applicable to Tort Maintenance Coverage, except that the Commis-
sioner may by regulation apply pertinent provisions applicable to Per-
sonal Injury Protection to Tort Maintenance Coverage.55
SECTION 35. SEVERABILITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY. 5 6 If any pro-
vision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circum-
stance is held to be unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, the
remainder of this Act and the application of such provision to other
persons or circumstances are not affected thereby, and it is to be con-
clusively presumed that the legislature would have enacted the re-
mainder of this Act without such invalid or unconstitutional provision,
except that if section 14 is found to be unconstitutional or invalid, it is
to be conclusively presumed that the legislature would not have en-
acted the remainder of this Act without such limitations, and the en-
tire Act is invalid. If section 14 is found to be unconstitutional or
invalid, Personal Injury Protection Insurers have no obligation to pay
Personal Injury Protection benefits with respect to accidents occur-
ring on or after the date of the finding of such unconstitutionality or
invalidity and, in addition, are subrogated to all of the rights of Per-
sonal Injury Protection Insureds for all previous such benefits paid.
54. Id. at 979 & n.119.
55. This could be done, for example, in having Tort Maintenance Coverage track Per-
sonal Injury Protection coverage for recovery of uncompensated economic loss. See supra
section 14.
56. O'Connell, supra note 1 to Appendix B, at 980 & n.123.
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SECTION 36. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT.5 7 In addition to the pro-
visions of section 35, because the legislature finds and declares that
questions of law may exist with respect to the constitutionality of some
of the sections of this Act, the public welfare requires that such ques-
tions with respect to this Act be resolved with expedition prior to such
time as its mandatory provisions take effect in order to avoid disrup-
tion of the orderly implementation of its provisions. Therefore, the
legislature finds that the remedy of declaratory judgment to deter-
mine the constitutionality of the provisions of this Act should immedi-
ately be made available to determine those important questions, in
order to avoid utter confusion by the public in the event this Act is
declared unconstitutional after [its effective date]. Therefore, any res-
ident of the State is authorized to forthwith bring an action for a de-
claratory judgment in the court, for
County against the Commissioner to determine
the constitutionality of this Act's provisions. Such court shall reserve
the questions of law for the advice of the Supreme Court as provided
by law. In the interest of expediting a decision, the Supreme Court
may suspend its rules as provided therein.
SECTION 37. EFFECTIVE DATE. This Act takes effect on
and applies to the use or operation of motor vehi-
cles within this State on and after such date. Sections 23, 26, 27, 28,
29, 32 and 36 of this Act shall take effect immediately in order that all
actions necessary to prepare for the implementation and administra-
tion of this Act may be completed at least 90 days prior to the effective
date.
57. Id. at 980-81 & n.124.
1995]
